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Welfare effects of supplementary insurance: a comment

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  • Danzon, Patricia M.

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  • Danzon, Patricia M., 2002. "Welfare effects of supplementary insurance: a comment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 923-926, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:21:y:2002:i:5:p:923-926
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. B. Dahlby, 1981. "Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 547-558, January.
    2. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    3. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mathias Kifmann, 2006. "Risk selection and complementary health insurance: The Swiss approach," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 151-170, June.
    2. Ellert, Alexander & Urmann, Oliver, 2012. "Competition in the market for supplementary health insurance: The case of competing nonprofit sickness funds," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 25 [rev.], University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
    3. Nathalie Fombaron & Carine Milcent, 2007. "The distortionary effect of health insurance on health demand," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587713, HAL.
    4. Marisol Rodríguez & Alexandrina Stoyanova, 2006. "Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives," Working Papers CREAP2006-12, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised Dec 2006.
    5. Hongyun Zhou & Jiqing Hong & Su Yang & Yuxuan Huang, 2022. "The Impact of Social Capital on Rural Residents’ Medical Service Utilization in China—An Empirical Study Based on CFPS Data," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(23), pages 1-19, November.
    6. Paola Bertoli & Veronica Grembi, 2018. "Courts, scheduled damages, and medical malpractice insurance," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 831-854, September.
    7. Omar Paccagnella & Vincenzo Rebba & Guglielmo Weber, 2013. "VOLUNTARY PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE AMONG THE OVER 50s IN EUROPE," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(3), pages 289-315, March.
    8. Alessandro Petretto, 2013. "On the Fuzzy Boundaries between Public and Private in Health-Care Organization and Funding Systems," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 1, pages 327-370, January-M.
    9. Marisol Rodríguez & Alexandrina Stoyanova, 2008. "Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(2), pages 185-202, February.

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