The impact of managed care on the existence of equilibrium in health insurance markets
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Cited by:
- Rachel Kreier & Bhaswati Sengupta, 2015. "Income, Health, and the Value of Preserving Options," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 43(4), pages 431-448, December.
- Allen C. Goodman & Miron Stano, 2000. "Hmos and Health Externalities: A Local Public Good Perspective," Public Finance Review, , vol. 28(3), pages 247-269, May.
- Michiel Bijlsma & Jan Boone & Gijsbert Zwart, 2014.
"Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 792-815, December.
- Michiel Bijlsma & Gijsbert Zwart & Jan Boone, 2011. "Competition leverage: How the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment," CPB Discussion Paper 181, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Bijlsma, M. & Boone, J. & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2011. "Competition Leverage : How the Demand Side Affects Optimal Risk Adjustment," Discussion Paper 2011-071, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Boone, Jan & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2011. "Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8461, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco A. Castaneda & James Marton, 2013. "Employer-Provided Health Insurance and the Adverse Selection Problem," Public Finance Review, , vol. 41(1), pages 3-36, January.
- David Bardey & Jean‐Charles Rochet, 2010.
"Competition Among Health Plans: A Two‐Sided Market Approach,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 435-451, June.
- David Bardey & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2009. "Competition among health plans: a two-sided market approach," Documentos de Trabajo 5217, Universidad del Rosario.
- M. Kate Bundorf, 2003. "The Effects of Offering Health Plan Choice within Employment-Based Purchasing Groups," NBER Working Papers 9996, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- M. Kate Bundorf, 2010. "The Effects of Offering Health Plan Choice Within Employment‐Based Purchasing Groups," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 105-127, March.
- Srivatsa Srinivas, S. & Marathe, Rahul R., 2021. "Averting adverse selection: The Government of India's scheme to distribute affordable medicines," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
- Jack, William, 2002.
"Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with ex ante adverse selection and ex post moral hazard,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 251-278, May.
- Jack, W., 1998. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Ex Ante Adverse Slection and Ex Post Moral Hazard," Papers 340, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
- Xinyan Shi & Lydia Gan, 2023. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Medical Tourism," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 11(2), pages 246-269, August.
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