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Incentives for cooperation in quality improvement among hospitals--the impact of the reimbursement system

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  • Kesteloot, K.
  • Voet, N.

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  • Kesteloot, K. & Voet, N., 1998. "Incentives for cooperation in quality improvement among hospitals--the impact of the reimbursement system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 701-728, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:17:y:1998:i:6:p:701-728
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Danzon, Patricia Munch, 1982. "Hospital `profits' : The effects of reimbursement policies," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 29-52, May.
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    3. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    4. Jeffrey E. Harris, 1979. "Pricing Rules for Hospitals," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 224-243, Spring.
    5. Edward C. Norton, 1992. "Incentive Regulation of Nursing Homes: Specification Tests of the Markov Model," NBER Chapters, in: Topics in the Economics of Aging, pages 275-304, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Norton, Edward C., 1992. "Incentive regulation of nursing homes," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 105-128, August.
    7. George W. Wilson & Joseph M. Jadlow, 1982. "Competition, Profit Incentives, and Technical Efficiency in the Provision of Nuclear Medicine Services," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 472-482, Autumn.
    8. Jeffrey E. Harris, 1977. "The Internal Organization of Hospitals: Some Economic Implications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 467-482, Autumn.
    9. Avner Shaked & John Sutton, 1990. "Multiproduct Firms and Market Structure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 45-62, Spring.
    10. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M, 1998. "Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1093-1110, July.
    11. Cohen, Joel W. & Spector, William D., 1996. "The effect of Medicaid reimbursement on quality of care in nursing homes," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 23-48, February.
    12. Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
    13. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1990. "Optimal payment systems for health services," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 375-396, December.
    14. Nyman, John A., 1985. "Prospective and `cost-plus' medicaid reimbursement, excess medicaid demand, and the quality of nursing home care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 237-259, September.
    15. Lee, A. James & Birnbaum, Howard & Bishop, Christine, 1983. "How nursing homes behave: A multi-equation model of nursing home behavior," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 17(23), pages 1897-1906, January.
    16. Cutler, David M, 1995. "The Incidence of Adverse Medical Outcomes under Prospective Payment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 29-50, January.
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    18. Feldstein, Martin S, 1971. "Hospital Cost Inflation: A Study of Nonprofit Price Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(5), pages 853-872, December.
    19. Pauly, Mark V & Redisch, Michael, 1973. "The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a Physicians' Cooperative," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 87-99, March.
    20. Richard G. Frank & Judith R. Lave, 1989. "A Comparison of Hospital Responses to Reimbursement Policies for Medicaid Psychiatric Patients," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 588-600, Winter.
    21. Gertler, Paul J., 1989. "Subsidies, quality, and the regulation of nursing homes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 33-52, February.
    22. Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 1993. "Supply-Side and Demand-Side Cost Sharing in Health Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 135-151, Fall.
    23. Rogerson, William P, 1994. "Choice of Treatment Intensities by a Nonprofit Hospital under Prospective Pricing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 7-51, Spring.
    24. Pope, Gregory C., 1989. "Hospital nonprice competition and medicare reimbursement policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 147-172, June.
    25. Hodgkin, Dominic & McGuire, Thomas G., 1994. "Payment levels and hospital response to prospective payment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-29, March.
    26. John A. Nyman, 1988. "Excess Demand, the Percentage of Medicaid Patients, and the Quality of Nursing Home Care," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 23(1), pages 76-92.
    27. Joskow, Paul L., 1983. "Reimbursement policy, cost containment and non-price competition," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 167-174, August.
    28. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June.
    29. Pauly, Mark V, 1987. "Nonprofit Firms in Medical Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 257-262, May.
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    31. Joseph P. Newhouse, 1996. "Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1236-1263, September.
    32. Weisbrod, Burton A, 1991. "The Health Care Quadrilemma: An Essay on Technological Change, Insurance, Quality of Care, and Cost Containment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 29(2), pages 523-552, June.
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    34. Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G, 1994. "Payer Competition and Cost Shifting in Health Care," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 71-92, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Patricia Ex & Cornelia Henschke, 2019. "Changing payment instruments and the utilisation of new medical technologies," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 20(7), pages 1029-1039, September.
    2. Vrangbaek, Karsten & Bech, Mickael, 2004. "County level responses to the introduction of DRG rates for "extended choice" hospital patients in Denmark," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 25-37, January.
    3. Stenbacka Rune & Tombak Mihkel, 2018. "Optimal Reimbursement Policy in Health Care: Competition, Ownership Structure and Quality Provision," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-19, January.
    4. Rune Stenbacka & Mihkel Tombak, 2014. "Optimal Co-Payment Policy In Health Care: Competition, Ownership Structure And Quality Provision," Working Papers 140004, Canadian Centre for Health Economics.
    5. Daniel Friesner & Robert Rosenman, 2001. "The Property Rights Theory of the Firm and Mixed Competition: A Counter-Example in the US Health Care Industry," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 437-450.
    6. Kurt R. Brekke & Lars Sørgard, 2007. "Public versus private health care in a national health service," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(6), pages 579-601, June.
    7. Evrim Güneş & Stephen Chick & Luk Wassenhove, 2010. "Quality competition for screening and treatment services," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 201-222, July.
    8. Selder, Astrid, 2005. "Physician reimbursement and technology adoption," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 907-930, September.
    9. Gauri, Varun, 2001. "Are incentives everything? payment mechanisms for health care providers in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2624, The World Bank.
    10. Fereshteh Farzianpour & Efat Mohamadi & Zhila najafpour & Taraneh Yousefinezhadi & Sara Forootan & Abbas Rahimi Foroushani, 2016. "Evaluation of Effective Factors on the Clinical Performance of General Surgeons in Tehran University of Medical Science, 2015," Global Journal of Health Science, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 8(9), pages 1-66, September.

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