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Agree to disagree: Lender equity holdings, within-syndicate conflicts, and covenant design

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  • Chu, Yongqiang
  • Lin, Luca X.
  • Xiao, Zhanbing

Abstract

Lenders’ simultaneous equity holdings introduce conflicts of interest among members of syndicated loans. We argue that lenders address such within-syndicate conflicts with financial covenant design to improve contracting efficiency. We show that loans with higher conflicts rely less on performance-based covenants, which serve as tripwires to facilitate ex-post control transfer and require coordination among syndicate members. Instead, high-conflict loans rely more on capital-based covenants to align shareholder-creditor interest ex-ante and incentivize shareholder monitoring. Overall, these results suggest that such conflicts can reduce capital flexibility and renegotiation efficiency for the borrowers.

Suggested Citation

  • Chu, Yongqiang & Lin, Luca X. & Xiao, Zhanbing, 2024. "Agree to disagree: Lender equity holdings, within-syndicate conflicts, and covenant design," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:57:y:2024:i:c:s1042957323000487
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101065
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Within-syndicate conflicts; Dual holders; Loan covenants;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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