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Rationality and Coherent Theories of Strategic Behavior

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  • Gul, Faruk

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  • Gul, Faruk, 1996. "Rationality and Coherent Theories of Strategic Behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 1-31, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:70:y:1996:i:1:p:1-31
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    Cited by:

    1. Françoise Forges & József Sákovics, 2022. "Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 589-605, November.
    2. Oliver Board, 2002. "Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games," Working Paper 244, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2002.
    3. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.
    4. Juan Enrique Martinez-Legaz & Antoine Soubeyran, 2003. "Learning from Errors," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 557.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    5. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2000. "The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(3), pages 677-687.
    6. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 2003. "Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-38, March.
    7. Hu, Tai-Wei, 2007. "On p-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 379-391, September.
    8. Kuzmics, Christoph, 2011. "On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 452-466, June.
    9. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
    10. Luo, Xiao & Qiao, Yongchuan, 2017. "Corrigendum to “Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior” [J. Econ. Theory 70 (1) (1996) 1–31]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 269-273.
    11. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    12. Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Chen Qu, 2020. "Iterated elimination procedures," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(2), pages 437-465, September.
    13. Shimoji, Makoto & Watson, Joel, 1998. "Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 161-195, December.
    14. Boris Salazar, 2004. "Nash y von Neumann: mundos posibles y juegos de lenguaje," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 6(10), pages 71-94, January-J.
    15. Sandroni, Alvaro, 2000. "Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 157-182, August.
    16. Licun Xue, "undated". "A Notion of Consistent Rationalizability - Between Weak and Pearce's Extensive Form Rationalizability," Economics Working Papers 2000-4, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    17. Zambrano, Eduardo, 2008. "Epistemic conditions for rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 395-405, May.
    18. Sobel, Joel, 2000. "Economists' Models of Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 241-261, October.
    19. Ewerhart, Christian, 2000. "Chess-like Games Are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 41-47, October.

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