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Incentive-Efficient Equilibria of Two-Party Sealed-Bid Bargaining Games

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  • Gresik, Thomas A.

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  • Gresik, Thomas A., 1996. "Incentive-Efficient Equilibria of Two-Party Sealed-Bid Bargaining Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 26-48, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:68:y:1996:i:1:p:26-48
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    Cited by:

    1. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Neutral public good mechanisms," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(4), pages 1-16, April.
    2. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2007. "A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 441-466, March.
    4. Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsat?Author-Name: Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 502.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    5. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2020. "Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 108-116.
    6. Jarque, Xavier & Ponsati, Clara & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2003. "Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 803-830, September.
    7. Mingshi Kang & Charles Z. Zheng, 2023. "Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 1141-1180, May.
    8. Didier Laussel & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003. "Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(3), pages 449-478, July.

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