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Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games

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  • Osborne, Martin J.

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  • Osborne, Martin J., 1990. "Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 22-36, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:50:y:1990:i:1:p:22-36
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    Cited by:

    1. De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004. "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 41-54, January.
    2. Anthony Fai-Tong Chung, 2004. "Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 581, Econometric Society.
    3. Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren & Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Forward induction in a wage repeated negotiation," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-16, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie, 1992. "Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 36-51.
    5. Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    6. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2018. "Inefficient stage Nash is not stable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 275-293.
    7. Catonini, Emiliano, 2020. "On non-monotonic strategic reasoning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 209-224.
    8. Robles, Jack, 2001. "Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 312-330, February.
    9. Maarten C.W. Janssen, 2003. "Auctions as Collusion Devices," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-017/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    10. Catonini, Emiliano, 2019. "Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 101-117.
    11. Amit Pazgal, 1995. "Satisficing Leads to Cooperation in Mutual Interests Games," Discussion Papers 1126, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Janssen, Maarten C.W., 2006. "Auctions as coordination devices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 517-532, April.

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