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Blackwell's ordering and public information

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  • Campbell, Colin M.

Abstract

We characterize a precise comparative static on welfare and the amount of public information in an economy under uncertainty. Results dating to Hirshleifer (1971) have suggested that information can have negative value in such a setting, but counterexamples using competitive equilibrium outcomes have suppressed general results to this effect. We show that under the solution concept of implementable allocations, the negative relationship between more public information in the sense of Blackwell and welfare is fully general. Furthermore, Blackwell's ranking is necessary as well as sufficient to obtain our ranking, and hence ours provides an equivalent characterization of his ordering.
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Suggested Citation

  • Campbell, Colin M., 2004. "Blackwell's ordering and public information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 179-197, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:114:y:2004:i:2:p:179-197
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hakansson, Nils H & Kunkel, J Gregory & Ohlson, James A, 1982. "Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for Information to Have Social Value in Pure Exchange," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(5), pages 1169-1181, December.
    2. Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2003. "Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(1), pages 43-58, January.
    3. Green, Jerry R, 1981. "Value of Information with Sequential Futures Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 335-358, March.
    4. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    5. Edward E. Schlee, 2001. "The Value of Information in Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 509-524, June.
    6. Marshall, John M, 1974. "Private Incentives and Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 373-390, June.
    7. Kunkel, J Gregory, 1982. "Sufficient Conditions for Public Information to Have Social Value in a Production and Exchange Economy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1005-1013, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lundtofte, Frederik & Leoni, Patrick, 2014. "Growth forecasts, belief manipulation and capital markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 108-125.
    2. Spyros Galanis, 2021. "Speculative trade and the value of public information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 53-68, February.
    3. Piero Gottardi & Rohit Rahi, 2014. "Value Of Information In Competitive Economies With Incomplete Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(1), pages 57-81, February.
    4. Galanis, Spyros, 2016. "The value of information in risk-sharing environments with unawareness," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1602, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    5. Galanis, Spyros, 2016. "The value of information in risk-sharing environments with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 1-18.
    6. M. Ali Khan & Haomiao Yu & Zhixiang Zhang, 2019. "Information Structures on a General State Space: An Equivalence Theorem and an Application," Working Papers 076, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
    7. Khan, M. Ali & Yu, Haomiao & Zhang, Zhixiang, 2024. "On comparisons of information structures with infinite states," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    8. Piergiuseppe Morone, 2004. "Investigating The Effects Of Information On Income Distribution Using Experimental Data," Experimental 0407006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Colin Campbell, 2004. "Implementation and orderings of public information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(1), pages 43-57, December.
    10. Ryan T. Ball, 2013. "Does Anticipated Information Impose a Cost on Risk‐Averse Investors? A Test of the Hirshleifer Effect," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 31-66, March.

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    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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