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Pathologies of the state

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  • Besley, Timothy

Abstract

This paper uses a simple dynamic model where a government performs three functions: taxation, public spending and contract enforcement to study pathologies in resource allocation by government. A key feature of the approach is that states may invest in their future capacities to raise taxes and protect property rights. Three types of state are shown to be possible in this framework: common-interest states, redistributive states and weak states whose emergence depends on the nature of political institutions. We consider both Pigouvian and Wicksellian benchmarks against which to compare different outcomes that might arise in political equilibrium. The paper argues for a greater focus on weak government and points out that a failure to generate Wicksellian unanimity lies behind them.

Suggested Citation

  • Besley, Timothy, 2011. "Pathologies of the state," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 339-350.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:80:y:2011:i:2:p:339-350
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.08.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Radygin, Alexander & Entov, Revold, 2013. ""Fundamental" theorem of privatization: ideology, evolution, practice," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, pages 7-45, December.
    3. Jimenez-Ayora, Pablo & Ulubaşoğlu, Mehmet Ali, 2015. "What underlies weak states? The role of terrain ruggedness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 167-183.
    4. Naso, Pedro & Bulte, Erwin & Swanson, Tim, 2020. "Legal pluralism in post-conflict Sierra Leone," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    5. Rodriguez Acosta, Mauricio, 2016. "Essays in political economy and resource economic : A macroeconomic approach," Other publications TiSEM 1e39ef1b-43a2-4f95-892c-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Cingolani L, 2013. "The State of State Capacity : a review of concepts, evidence and measures," MERIT Working Papers 2013-053, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    7. Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "State capacity and public choice: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 289-309, January.
    8. Alexander Radygin & Revold Entov, 2014. "The Fundamental Privatization Theorem: Ideology, Evolution, Practice," Working Papers 0087, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2014.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public choice; weak states;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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