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Sharing of endogenous risk in construction

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  • Olsen, Trond E.
  • Osmundsen, Petter

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  • Olsen, Trond E. & Osmundsen, Petter, 2005. "Sharing of endogenous risk in construction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 511-526, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:58:y:2005:i:4:p:511-526
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
    2. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    3. Emhjellen, Kjetil & Emhjellen, Magne & Osmundsen, Petter, 2002. "Investment cost estimates and investment decisions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 91-96, January.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    5. Osmundsen, Petter, 1999. "Risk sharing and incentives in norwegian petroleum extraction," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(9), pages 549-555, September.
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    1. Emhjellen, Kjetil & Emhjellen, Magne & Osmundsen, Petter, 2002. "Investment cost estimates and investment decisions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 91-96, January.
    2. Shantia, Ali & Aflaki, Sam & Masini, Andrea, 2021. "Contracting for technology improvement: The effect of asymmetric bargaining power and investment uncertainty," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 293(2), pages 481-494.
    3. Osmundsen, Petter & Sørenes, Terje & Toft, Anders, 2008. "Drilling contracts and incentives," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 3128-3134, August.
    4. Ginés Rus & M. Socorro, 2010. "Infrastructure Investment and Incentives with Supranational Funding," Transition Studies Review, Springer;Central Eastern European University Network (CEEUN), vol. 17(3), pages 551-567, September.
    5. Osmundsen, Petter & Aven, Terje & Tomasgard, Asgeir, 2010. "On incentives for assurance of petroleum supply," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 143-148.
    6. Osmundsen, Petter, 2011. "Colloboration in Norway's offshore sector. Contracts and incentives," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2011/4, University of Stavanger.
    7. Osmundsen, Petter, 2013. "Robust Strategies for rig procurement," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2013/6, University of Stavanger.
    8. Osmundsen, Petter & Aven, Terje & Erik Vinnem, Jan, 2008. "Safety, economic incentives and insurance in the Norwegian petroleum industry," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 137-143.

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