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Job transfer and influence activities

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  • Eguchi, Kyota

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  • Eguchi, Kyota, 2005. "Job transfer and influence activities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 187-197, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:56:y:2005:i:2:p:187-197
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    1. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February.
    2. Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Introduction to "Schooling, Experience, and Earnings"," NBER Chapters, in: Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, pages 1-4, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Metin M. Cosgel & Thomas J. Miceli, 1999. "Job Rotation: Cost, Benefits, and Stylized Facts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(2), pages 301-301, June.
    4. Green, Jerry R & Stokey, Nancy L, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 349-364, June.
    5. George Baker, 2002. "Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 728-751.
    6. Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Schooling, Experience, and Earnings," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number minc74-1.
    7. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
    8. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 2000. "Multitask Learning and the Reorganization of Work: From Tayloristic to Holistic Organization," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 353-376, July.
    9. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    10. Barry W. Ickes & Larry Samuelson, 1987. "Job Transfers and Incentives in Complex Organizations: Thwarting the Ratchet Effect," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 275-286, Summer.
    11. Carmichael, H Lorne & MacLeod, W Bentley, 1993. "Multiskilling, Technical Change and the Japanese Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 142-160, January.
    12. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 5, pages 57-58, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-990, October.
    14. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    15. Itoh, Hideshi, 1987. "Information processing capacities of the firm," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 299-326, September.
    16. Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu & MacLeod, W Bentley, 1992. "The Ratchet Effect and the Market for Secondhand Workers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(1), pages 85-98, January.
    17. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
    18. Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Schooling and Earnings," NBER Chapters, in: Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, pages 41-63, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    20. Eguchi, Kyota, 2004. "Trainers' dilemma of choosing between training and promotion," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 765-783, December.
    21. Ichniowski, Casey & Shaw, Kathryn & Prennushi, Giovanna, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 291-313, June.
    22. Sherwin Rosen, 1972. "Learning and Experience in the Labor Market," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 7(3), pages 326-342.
    23. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    24. Kochan, Thomas A., 1996. "What works at work : overview and assessment," Working papers 3886-96., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
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    Cited by:

    1. Takii, Katsuya & Sasaki, Masaru & Wan, Junmin, 2020. "Synchronized job transfer and task-specific human capital," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    2. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
    3. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo Mialon, 2010. "Multi-activity contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 23-43, April.
    4. Eguchi, Kyota, 2004. "Trainers' dilemma of choosing between training and promotion," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 765-783, December.
    5. Arthur Schram & Jordi Brandts & Klarita Gërxhani, 2007. "Information Networks and Worker Recruitment," Working Papers 316, Barcelona School of Economics.
    6. Kenta Kojima & Katsuya Takii, 2019. "Successful and Dead-end Jobs in a Bureaucracy:Evidence from Japan," OSIPP Discussion Paper 19E008, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
    7. Müller, Daniel, 2010. "On Horns and Halos: Confirmation Bias and Job Rotation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 05/2010, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    8. Schram, Arthur & Brandts, Jordi & Gërxhani, Klarita, 2010. "Information, bilateral negotiations, and worker recruitment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 1035-1058, November.
    9. Chandra Sekhar & Manoj Patwardhan & Rohit Kumar Singh, 2016. "Prioritising the dimensions of employee motivation using analytic hierarchy process," International Journal of Business and Emerging Markets, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 8(1), pages 49-66.
    10. Klarita Gerxhani & Jordi Brandts & Arthur Schram, 2011. "The Emergence of Social Structure: Employer Information Networks in an Experimental Labor Market," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-032/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    11. Katolnik, Svetlana & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2014. "On the Incentive Effect of Job Rotation," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100574, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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