Proxy contests and corporate democracy
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References listed on IDEAS
- Dodd, Peter & Warner, Jerold B., 1983. "On corporate governance : A study of proxy contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 401-438, April.
- Easterbrook, Frank H & Fischel, Daniel R, 1983. "Voting in Corporate Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 395-427, June.
- Peter M. DeMarzo, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(3), pages 713-734.
- Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(2), pages 110-110.
- Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 351-351.
- Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate governance : Voting rights and majority rules," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 203-235, January.
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Cited by:
- Nobuo Akai & Kazuhiko Mikami, 2005. "On Fiscal Federalism under Democracy," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-313, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, 2001. "Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 8633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hart, Oliver & Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 2001. "Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 3073, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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