On the limits to the growth of coalitions by means of transfers
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- R. Rothschild, "undated". "On the Limits to the Growth of Coalitions by Means of Transfers," Working Papers ec11/95, Department of Economics, University of Lancaster.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2005. "Stable cartels revisited," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 907-921, November.
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