IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v227y2024ics0167268124002993.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A corruption dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Ahloy, James
  • Gilland, Rebecca
  • Hamman, John R.

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the effects of uncertain negative externalities on corruption engagement and social beliefs. We report two experiments in which corruption is modeled as a common-pool resource. In our first experiment, participants face a decision to bribe a public official for a service where accepted bribes impose probabilistic external costs on the briber and other participants. We find that the decision to bribe is positively associated with the belief that others will do the same. We also find that participants overestimate their ability to avoid external costs. Experiment 2 explores endogeneity and ambiguity in types using a contextualized version of the corruption dilemma. Consistent with experiment 1, choosing to offer a bribe is positively associated with the expectation of similar behavior. Curiously, we find little evidence that beliefs about one’s own type affect the decision to bribe.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahloy, James & Gilland, Rebecca & Hamman, John R., 2024. "A corruption dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:227:y:2024:i:c:s0167268124002993
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106693
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124002993
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106693?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Social dilemma; Beliefs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:227:y:2024:i:c:s0167268124002993. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.