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Cream skimming: Theory and evidence from hospital transfers and capacity utilization

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  • Yang, Ou
  • Chan, Marc K.
  • Cheng, Terence C.
  • Yong, Jongsay

Abstract

The paper examines cream skimming behaviour by studying hospital transfers in a mixed public-private hospital system. A key innovation is the use of capacity utilization to identify cream skimming. We develop a dynamic model with uncertain patient arrivals and hospital capacity constraints to clarify the conditions under which a profit maximizing hospital will engage in patient selection by transferring ‘hard’ patients—those with severe/complex conditions—to free up capacity to accommodate ‘easy’ patients with few severe/complex conditions. Given finite capacity, public hospitals are strictly less likely to transfer patients than profit-motivated private hospitals at the same level of capacity. We test implications of the model using hospital administrative data from Victoria, Australia, and find empirical support for the cream skimming predictions of the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Yang, Ou & Chan, Marc K. & Cheng, Terence C. & Yong, Jongsay, 2020. "Cream skimming: Theory and evidence from hospital transfers and capacity utilization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 68-87.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:173:y:2020:i:c:p:68-87
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.024
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    2. Christoph Strumann & Alexander Geissler & Reinhard Busse & Christoph Pross, 2022. "Can competition improve hospital quality of care? A difference-in-differences approach to evaluate the effect of increasing quality transparency on hospital quality," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 23(7), pages 1229-1242, September.
    3. Kerstens, Kristiaan & Shen, Zhiyang, 2021. "Using COVID-19 mortality to select among hospital plant capacity models: An exploratory empirical application to Hubei province," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    4. Thomas Stratmann & Markus Bjoerkheim & Christopher Koopman, 2024. "The Causal Effect of Repealing Certificate-of-Need Laws for Ambulatory Surgical Centers: Does Access to Medical Services Increase?," Papers 2405.08160, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cream skimming; Hospital transfers; Capacity utilization; Mixed private-public hospital system;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D25 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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