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Multi-player race

Author

Listed:
  • Doğan, Serhat
  • Karagözoğlu, Emin
  • Keskin, Kerim
  • Sağlam, Çağrı

Abstract

We present a model of race with multiple players and study players’ effort choices and expected prizes in equilibrium. We show that, in equilibrium, once any two players win one battle each, the remaining players do not exert any effort anymore. This turns the continuation game into a two-player race. This is different than the results in previous two-player models of race, which report that all states of the game are reached with positive probabilities. We also provide a set of comparative static results on the effects of the number of players and the victory threshold.

Suggested Citation

  • Doğan, Serhat & Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2018. "Multi-player race," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 123-136.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:149:y:2018:i:c:p:123-136
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Subhasish Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2013. "An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 833-861, April.
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    11. Zeynep B. Irfanoglu & Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2014. "The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests," Working Papers 14-15, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2021. "Race meets bargaining in product development," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(3), pages 702-709, April.
    2. Deren Çağlayan & Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2022. "Effort comparisons for a class of four-player tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 119-137, July.
    3. Peter-J. Jost, 2021. "“The ball is round, the game lasts 90 minutes, everything else is pure theoryâ€," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(1), pages 27-74, January.
    4. Christian Ewerhart & Julian Teichgräber, 2019. "Multi-battle contests, finite automata, and the tug-of-war," ECON - Working Papers 318, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Emin Karagözoglu & Cagri Saglam & Agah R. Turan, 2020. "Tullock Brings Perseverance and Suspense to Tug-of-War," CESifo Working Paper Series 8103, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contests; Discouragement effect; Dynamic games; Momentum effect; Race;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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