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A Darwinian theory of institutional evolution two centuries before Darwin?

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  • Grajzl, Peter
  • Murrell, Peter

Abstract

How effective institutions come about and how they change are fundamental questions for economics and social science more generally. We show that these questions were central in the deliberations of lawyers in 17th century England, a critical historical juncture that has motivated important institutional theories. We argue that the lawyers held a conceptualization of institutional development that foreshadowed many elements of Darwinism, more than two centuries before Darwin’s great contributions. To this end, we first identify a set of features characteristic of Darwinian evolutionary social-science theories. We then match the lawyers’ own words to these features, revealing the many congruities between a Darwinian approach and the lawyers’ evolutionary model of institutional construction and change. Finally, we analyze the normative conclusions on institutional development that the lawyers drew from their evolutionary analysis.

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  • Grajzl, Peter & Murrell, Peter, 2016. "A Darwinian theory of institutional evolution two centuries before Darwin?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 346-372.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:131:y:2016:i:pa:p:346-372
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.09.007
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell, 2021. "Characterizing a legal–intellectual culture: Bacon, Coke, and seventeenth-century England," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 15(1), pages 43-88, January.
    2. Grajzl, Peter & Murrell, Peter, 2024. "Caselaw and England's economic performance during the Industrial Revolution: Data and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 145-165.
    3. Grajzl, Peter & Murrell, Peter, 2019. "Toward understanding 17th century English culture: A structural topic model of Francis Bacon's ideas," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 111-135.
    4. Grajzl, Peter & Murrell, Peter, 2023. "A macrohistory of legal evolution and coevolution: Property, procedure, and contract in early-modern English caselaw," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    5. Murrell, Peter, 2017. "Design and evolution in institutional development: The insignificance of the English Bill of Rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 36-55.
    6. Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell, 2023. "Of families and inheritance: law and development in England before the Industrial Revolution," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 17(3), pages 387-432, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institutions; Evolutionary theory; Darwinism; Common law; 17th Century England;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B00 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - General - - - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • P40 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - General

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