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Decentralization and trust in government: Quasi-experimental evidence from Ukraine

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  • Arends, Helge
  • Brik, Tymofii
  • Herrmann, Benedikt
  • Roesel, Felix

Abstract

Can decentralization of political powers increase trust in government? We present quasi-experimental evidence from Ukraine where political trust has been among the lowest levels worldwide. The national government devolved powers and resources to newly formed local governments (hromadas) between 2015 and 2020; this includes a substantial share of taxes on local incomes. We exploit local differences in the timing of the decentralization reform. Difference-in-differences estimations show that citizens in decentralized communities report more trust in local authorities and participate more often in local elections. The most likely mechanism is the democratic process of coming together to build new local communities. Local trust however does not spill over to trust in national institutions. The results may explain the strong role of hromadas in Ukraine’s resilience against the detrimental effects of the Russian invasion.

Suggested Citation

  • Arends, Helge & Brik, Tymofii & Herrmann, Benedikt & Roesel, Felix, 2023. "Decentralization and trust in government: Quasi-experimental evidence from Ukraine," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 1356-1365.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:51:y:2023:i:4:p:1356-1365
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2023.08.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Mona Förtsch, 2024. "Local High School Closures and Voter Turnout: Evidence from East German Municipalities," ifo Working Paper Series 411, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decentralization; Devolution; Democracy; Trust; Resilience; Ukraine;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • P25 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
    • R50 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - General

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