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Transformation of the family farm under rising land pressure: A theoretical essay

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  • Guirkinger, Catherine
  • Platteau, Jean-Philippe

Abstract

If we understand well the individualization of land tenure rules under conditions of growing land scarcity and increased market integration, much less is known about the mode of evolution of the family farms possessing the land. Inspired by first-hand evidence from West Africa, this paper argues that these units undergo a similar process of individualization governed by the same forces as property rights in land. It provides a simple theoretical account of the coexistence of different forms of family when farms are heterogenous in land endowments and technology is stagnant. In particular, it throws light on the factors determining the coexistence of collective fields and individual plots inside the family farm, and on those driving the possible splitting of the family. The paper also offers analytical insights into the sequence following which such forms succeed each other.

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  • Guirkinger, Catherine & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2015. "Transformation of the family farm under rising land pressure: A theoretical essay," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 112-137.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:43:y:2015:i:1:p:112-137
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2014.06.002
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    Cited by:

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    2. Paresys, Lise & Malézieux, Eric & Huat, Joël & Kropff, Martin J. & Rossing, Walter A.H., 2018. "Between all-for-one and each-for-himself: On-farm competition for labour as determinant of wetland cropping in two Beninese villages," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 126-138.
    3. Aldashev, Gani & Guirkinger, Catherine, 2017. "Colonization and changing social structure: Evidence from Kazakhstan," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 413-430.
    4. Huet, E.K. & Adam, M. & Giller, K.E. & Descheemaeker, K., 2020. "Diversity in perception and management of farming risks in southern Mali," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    5. M. Niaz Asadullah & Zaki Wahhaj, 2019. "Early Marriage, Social Networks and the Transmission of Norms," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 86(344), pages 801-831, October.
    6. Jean-Marie Baland & Roberta Ziparo, 2017. "Intra-household bargaining in poor countries," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2017-108, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Thomas TB Baudin & Bram De Rock & Paula Eugenia Gobbi, 2021. "Economics and Family Structures," Working Papers ECARES 2021-21, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Gani Aldashev & Catherine Guirkinger, 2016. "Colonization and Changing Social Structure: Kazakhstan 1896-1910," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2016-10, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    9. Matthieu Delpierre & Catherine Guirkinger & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2019. "Risk as Impediment to Privatization? The Role of Collective Fields in Extended Agricultural Households," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(4), pages 863-905.
    10. Marie Christine Apedo-Amah & Habiba Djebbari & Roberta Ziparo, 2019. "Gender, information and the efficiency of household production decisions: An experiment in rural Togo," Working Papers halshs-02462673, HAL.
    11. Kazianga, Harounan & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2017. "Intra-household resource allocation and familial ties," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 109-132.
    12. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Guirkinger, Catherine, 2019. "The dynamics of family systems: lessons from past and present times," CEPR Discussion Papers 13570, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Jean-Marie Baland & Roberta Ziparo, 2017. "Intra-household bargaining in poor countries," WIDER Working Paper Series 108, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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