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A journey from a corruption port to a tax haven

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  • Hebous, Shafik
  • Lipatov, Vilen

Abstract

We sketch a model according to which tax havens attract corporate income generated in corrupted countries. We consider the choice of optimal bribes by corrupt officials and the share of the proceeds of corruption that will be concealed in tax havens. Our framework provides novel welfare implications of tax havens. First, tax havens’ services have a positive effect on welfare through encouraging investment by firms fearing expropriation and bribes in corrupt countries. Second, by supporting corruption and the concealment of officials’ bribes, tax havens discourage the provision of public goods and hence have also a negative effect on welfare. The net welfare effect depends on the specified preferences and parameters. One source of this ambiguity is that the presence of multinational firms in corrupted countries is positively associated with demanding tax havens’ operations. Using firm-level data, we provide new empirical results supporting this hypothesis.

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  • Hebous, Shafik & Lipatov, Vilen, 2014. "A journey from a corruption port to a tax haven," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 739-754.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:42:y:2014:i:3:p:739-754
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2013.05.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Katarzyna Bilicka & André Seidel, 2020. "Profit shifting and corruption," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(5), pages 1051-1080, October.
    2. Menkhoff, Lukas & Miethe, Jakob, 2019. "Tax evasion in new disguise? Examining tax havens' international bank deposits," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 176, pages 53-78.
    3. Shafik Hebous & Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2015. "What Do We Know about the Tax Planning of German-based Multinational Firms?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(04), pages 15-21, January.
    4. Hebous, Shafik & Johannesen, Niels, 2021. "At your service! The role of tax havens in international trade with services," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    5. Vincent Bouvatier & Gunther Capelle-Blancard & Anne-Laure Delatte, 2017. "Banks Defy Gravity in Tax Havens," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03101505, HAL.
    6. repec:ces:ifodic:v:12:y:2015:i:4:p:19149984 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Nouf Binhadab & Robert Gillanders & Thomas McCluskey, 2023. "A clean and discreet service: The role of corruption and secrecy in profit shifting by multinational firms," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(7), pages 1551-1573, October.
    8. Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Fangying Xu, 2019. "Are tax havens good? Implications of the crackdown on secrecy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 127(2), pages 147-160, July.
    9. Hoang Ha Nguyen Thi & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2023. "Tax Haven Welfare and the Crackdown on Secrecy: Evidence from Night Light Emissions," CESifo Working Paper Series 10721, CESifo.
    10. Shafik Hebous, 2014. "Money at the Docks of Tax Havens: A Guide," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 70(3), pages 458-485, September.
    11. Sharafutdinova,Gulnaz & Lokshin,Michael M., 2020. "Hide and Protect : A Role of Global Financial Secrecy in Shaping Domestic Institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9348, The World Bank.
    12. Leonce Ndikumana, 2014. "International Tax Cooperation and Implications of Globalization," CDP Background Papers 024, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
    13. Shafik Hebous & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 2015. "What Do We Know about the Tax Planning of German-based Multinational Firms?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(4), pages 15-21, 01.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax havens; Tax avoidance; Tax evasion; Multinational firms; Corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm

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