IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v54y2010i1p82-95.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment

Author

Listed:
  • Hong, Qing
  • Smart, Michael

Abstract

The multinationalization of corporate investment in recent years has given rise to a number of international tax avoidance schemes that may be eroding tax revenues in industrialized countries, but which may also reduce tax burdens on mobile capital and so facilitate investment. Both the welfare effects of and the optimal response to international tax planning are therefore ambiguous. Evaluating these factors in a simple general equilibrium model, we find that citizens of high-tax countries benefit from (some) tax planning. Paradoxically, if tax rates are not too high, an increase in tax planning activity causes a rise in optimal corporate tax rates, and a decline in multinational investment. Thus fears of a "race to the bottom" in corporate tax rates may be misplaced.

Suggested Citation

  • Hong, Qing & Smart, Michael, 2010. "In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 82-95, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:54:y:2010:i:1:p:82-95
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014-2921(09)00067-1
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Devereux, Michael P & Hubbard, R Glenn, 2003. "Taxing Multinationals," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(4), pages 469-487, August.
    2. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2000. "Corporate Tax Systems and Cross Country Profit Shifting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 306-325, April.
    3. Davies, Ronald B & Gresik, Thomas A, 2003. "Tax Competition and Foreign Capital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(2), pages 127-145, March.
    4. Peralta, Susana & Wauthy, Xavier & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Should countries control international profit shifting?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 24-37, January.
    5. Desai, Mihir A. & Dyck, Alexander & Zingales, Luigi, 2007. "Theft and taxes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 591-623, June.
    6. Bucovetsky, Sam & Haufler, Andreas, 2008. "Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 188-201, January.
    7. Fuest, Clemens & Hemmelgarn, Thomas, 2005. "Corporate tax policy, foreign firm ownership and thin capitalization," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 508-526, September.
    8. Janeba, Eckhard & Peters, Wolfgang, 1999. "Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains from Nondiscrimination: The Case of Interest Taxation in Europe," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(452), pages 93-101, January.
    9. Julie H. Collins & Douglas A. Shackelford, 2003. "Do US Multinationals Face Different Tax Burdens than Do Other Companies?," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 17, pages 141-168, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve & Wilson, John D., 2010. "Why do most countries set high tax rates on capital?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 249-259, March.
    11. Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November.
    12. Harry Grubert & Joel Slemrod, 1998. "The Effect Of Taxes On Investment And Income Shifting To Puerto Rico," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(3), pages 365-373, August.
    13. Slemrod, Joel, 2004. "Are corporate tax rates, or countries, converging?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1169-1186, June.
    14. Devereux, Michael P. & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2008. "Do countries compete over corporate tax rates?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1210-1235, June.
    15. Slemrod, Joel & Wilson, John D., 2009. "Tax competition with parasitic tax havens," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1261-1270, December.
    16. Jack Mintz, 2004. "Conduit Entities: Implications of Indirect Tax-Efficient Financing Structures for Real Investment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 11(4), pages 419-434, August.
    17. Gordon, Roger H, 1986. "Taxation of Investment and Savings in a World Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 1086-1102, December.
    18. James R. Hines & Eric M. Rice, 1994. "Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(1), pages 149-182.
    19. Martin Feldstein & James R. Hines Jr. & R. Glenn Hubbard, 1995. "Taxing Multinational Corporations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number feld95-1.
    20. Mintz, Jack & Smart, Michael, 2004. "Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1149-1168, June.
    21. Roger H. Gordon & Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & R. Glenn Hubbard, 1995. "The Importance of Income Shifting to the Design and Analysis of Tax Policy," NBER Chapters, in: Taxing Multinational Corporations, pages 29-38, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith & Alexander Klemm, 2002. "Corporate income tax reforms and international tax competition [‘Do domestic firms benefit from direct foreign investment? Evidence from Venezuela’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 449-495.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. George R. Zodrow, 2019. "Capital Mobility and Capital Tax Competition," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: George R Zodrow (ed.), TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE Selected Essays of George R. Zodrow, chapter 18, pages 543-570, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Haufler, Andreas & Runkel, Marco, 2012. "Firms' financial choices and thin capitalization rules under corporate tax competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1087-1103.
    3. Sebastian Krautheim & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2016. "Wages and International Tax Competition," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(5), pages 893-923, November.
    4. Mongrain, Steeve & Oh, David & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2023. "Tax competition in the presence of profit shifting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    5. Slemrod, Joel & Wilson, John D., 2009. "Tax competition with parasitic tax havens," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1261-1270, December.
    6. Hsun Chu & Chu-Chuan Cheng & Yu-Bong Lai, 2015. "A political economy of tax havens," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(6), pages 956-976, December.
    7. Haufler, Andreas & Klemm, Alexander & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2006. "Globalisation and the mix of wage and profit taxes," Discussion Papers in Economics 885, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    8. Haufler, Andreas, 2006. "Die Besteuerung multinationaler Unternehmen," Discussion Papers in Economics 1153, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    9. Krautheim, Sebastian & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim, 2011. "Heterogeneous firms, 'profit shifting' FDI and international tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1-2), pages 122-133, February.
    10. Johannesen, Niels, 2010. "Imperfect tax competition for profits, asymmetric equilibrium and beneficial tax havens," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 253-264, July.
    11. Hristu-Varsakelis, Dimitrios & Karagianni, Stella & Saraidaris, Anastasios, 2011. "Equilibrium conditions in corporate tax competition and Foreign Direct Investment flows," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 13-21.
    12. Devereux, Michael P. & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2008. "Do countries compete over corporate tax rates?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1210-1235, June.
    13. Johannes Becker & Clemens Fuest, 2011. "Optimal tax policy when firms are internationally mobile," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(5), pages 580-604, October.
    14. Amerighi, Oscar & Peralta, Susana, 2010. "The proximity-concentration trade-off with profit shifting," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 90-101, July.
    15. Shafik Hebous, 2014. "Money at the Docks of Tax Havens: A Guide," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 70(3), pages 458-485, September.
    16. Wolfgang Eggert & Andreas Haufler, 2006. "Company-Tax Coordination cum Tax-Rate Competition in the European Union," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(4), pages 579-601, December.
    17. Janeba, Eckhard & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2023. "The global minimum tax raises more revenues than you think, or much less," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    18. Egger, Peter & Eggert, Wolfgang & Winner, Hannes, 2010. "Saving taxes through foreign plant ownership," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 99-108, May.
    19. Sven Stöwhase, 2013. "How Profit Shifting May Increase the Tax Burden of Multinationals: A Simple Model with Discrete Investment Choices," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(2), pages 185-207, April.
    20. Hristu-Varsakelis, Dimitrios & Karagianni, Stella & Saraidaris, Anastasios, 2011. "Equilibrium conditions in corporate tax competition and Foreign Direct Investment flows," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 13-21, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Income shifting Tax planning Foreign direct investment Tax competition Thin capitalization;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:54:y:2010:i:1:p:82-95. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.