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Anticorruption regulation and firm value: Evidence from a shock of mandated resignation of directors in China

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  • Xu, Yongxin

Abstract

China's broad anti-corruption campaign includes a regulation that requires bureaucrats to resign from director positions in listed companies. Using this particular event to test the effect of the anticorruption regulation, we find that this regulation costs firms with banned directors on average 4%. This cost cannot be explained by the typical cost of losing a director or by damage from a political vendetta conducted by the leadership. We further show that the anticorruption regulation impedes firm value not only through political connections but also through the anticorruption disincentive, the incentive to act passively for fear of being accused of corruption. Finally, affected firms reduce their investments, hire more employees and have poor performance afterwards.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu, Yongxin, 2018. "Anticorruption regulation and firm value: Evidence from a shock of mandated resignation of directors in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 67-80.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:92:y:2018:i:c:p:67-80
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.05.008
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    Cited by:

    1. Deng, Jiapin & Lu, Di, 2024. "The Old Boys’ Club and Board Gender Diversity: Evidence from the Anti-corruption Campaign in China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 626-656.
    2. Hanming Fang & Jing Wu & Rongjie Zhang & Li-An Zhou, 2022. "Anti-Corruption Campaign and the Resurgence of the SOEs in China:Evidence from the Real Estate Sector," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    3. Hu, Yi & Wang, Changyun & Xiao, Gang & Zeng, Jianyu, 2020. "The agency cost of political connections: Evidence from China's File 18," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    4. Wei, Chunyan & Hu, Shiyang & Chen, Feng, 2020. "Do political connection disruptions increase labor costs in a government-dominated market? Evidence from publicly listed companies in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    5. Cheng, Lei, 2022. "Political capital and physical capital: Substitute or complement? Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(PB).
    6. Maoyong Cheng & Yutong Yao & Yu Meng, 2023. "Political uncertainty and foreign direct investment—Evidence from the government official vacancy in China's cities," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 31(3), pages 527-559, July.
    7. Ding, Haoyuan & Hu, Yichuan & Kim, Kenneth A. & Xie, Mi, 2023. "Relationship-based debt financing of Chinese private sector firms: The role of social connections to banks versus political connections," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    8. Yang, Hao & Zhang, Qiusheng & Zhao, Xiaofang & Wang, Zhongchao, 2022. "Does political corruption affect mergers and acquisitions decisions? Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 248-266.
    9. Wu, Yihan & Dong, Bin, 2021. "The value of independent directors: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    10. Ting Ren & Youzhi Xiao & Xinguo Yu & Hongyan Yang & Jianmei Ge, 2020. "Resignation of officials as independent directors and firm performance," Frontiers of Business Research in China, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-21, December.
    11. Lin, Lin & Nguyen, Nhut Hoang & Young, Martin & Zou, Liping, 2021. "Military executives and corporate outcomes: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    12. Cheng, Maoyong & Geng, Hongyan, 2021. "Do local firms employ political activities to respond to political uncertainty?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    13. Xie, Jun & Zhang, Yifan, 2020. "Anti-corruption, government intervention, and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 44(1).
    14. Hou, Qingsong & Li, Weifang & Teng, Min & Hu, May, 2022. "Just a short-lived glory?The effect of China's anti-corruption on the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    15. Shenghui Tong, 2022. "Corruption and anti‐corruption in China: a review and future research agenda," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 36(1), pages 3-16, May.
    16. Fan, Jijian, 2021. "The effect of regulating political connections: Evidence from China's board of directors ban," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 553-578.
    17. Yuan Qiu & Di Zhou, 2024. "De‐politicization and corporate social responsibility: Empirical evidence from China," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 31(4), pages 3668-3684, July.
    18. Chang, Yuyuan & Pan, Xiaofei & Wang, Jianling & Zhou, Qing, 2021. "Depoliticization and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from the mandated resignation of directors in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    19. Wei Wei & Yulia Muratova, 2022. "Executive power and politically connected independent directors: evidence from China," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(1), pages 1-24, February.
    20. Xiao, Gang & Shen, Sichen, 2022. "To pollute or not to pollute: Political connections and corporate environmental performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    21. He, Wenjian & Chen, Xiaoyang & Liu, Zhiyong John, 2022. "Can anti-corruption help realize the “strong” Porter Hypothesis in China? Evidence from Chinese manufacturing enterprises," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    22. Cheng, Maoyong & Yao, Yutong & Jin, Justin Y. & Nainar, Khalid & Meng, Yu, 2024. "Leadership vacuum and urban economic development: Evidence from a transition country," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 230-252.
    23. Maoyong Cheng & Zhenjun Li, 2023. "Public governance and firm total factor productivity: Evidence from a quasi‐natural event in China," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 31(3), pages 683-719, July.
    24. Kong, Dongmin & Shu, Yijia & Wang, Yanan, 2021. "Corruption and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China⋆," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    25. Liqiang Chen & Hong Fan & Xiaofei Song, 2023. "Impact of professor‐directors on Chinese firms' environmental performance," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 23(4), pages 696-720, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anticorruption regulation; Firm value; Political connection; Anticorruption disincentive;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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