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Financial crises and coordination failure: A comment

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  • Marshall, David A.

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  • Marshall, David A., 2002. "Financial crises and coordination failure: A comment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(2-3), pages 547-555, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:26:y:2002:i:2-3:p:547-555
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cooper,Russell, 1999. "Coordination Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521578967.
    2. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    3. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2001. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 139-184, June.
    4. Amable, Bruno & Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & De Bandt, Olivier, 2002. "Optimal capacity in the banking sector and economic growth," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(2-3), pages 491-517, March.
    5. Chui, Michael & Gai, Prasanna & Haldane, Andrew G., 2002. "Sovereign liquidity crises: Analytics and implications for public policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(2-3), pages 519-546, March.
    6. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
    7. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-438, July.
    8. John Bryant, 1983. "A Simple Rational Expectations Keynes-type Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 525-528.
    9. David A. Marshall, 2001. "The crisis of 1998 and the role of the central bank," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 25(Q I), pages 2-23.
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