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Government subsidies and corporate disclosure

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  • Huang, Ying

Abstract

Government subsidies allocated by politicians are ultimately funded by taxpayers, who care about how tax money is spent and demand transparency. I argue that subsidized firms, as beneficiaries of government subsidies, have incentives to provide more disclosures to help politicians achieve a reputation for transparency as well as to lower their own costs from public scrutiny. Using a novel dataset that tracks government subsidies, I provide the first large-sample evidence on the relation between government subsidies and firm disclosure. I find that relative to unsubsidized firms, subsidized firms provide more voluntary disclosures of general information about their business activities and profitability, as well as more disclosures of subsidy-goal-related information, such as job creation and capital investment. Further, these associations are stronger for firms operating in or obtaining subsidies from states whose politicians reveal a stronger preference for subsidy transparency, and for firms that are more likely to attract public scrutiny.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Ying, 2022. "Government subsidies and corporate disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:74:y:2022:i:1:s0165410122000039
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101480
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    2. Xingyu Lu & Tong Qi & Wenjing Xie, 2023. "Earnings Management of Chinese Listed Multinational Corporations," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 31(6), pages 179-206, November.
    3. Tang, Dapeng & Yu, Qian & Gebrehans, Mebrahtu Tesfagebreal & Wang, Lulu, 2023. "The asymmetric innovation effects of heterogeneous government subsidies: A new perspective from GDP target deviation," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
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