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Labor mobility and antitakeover provisions

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  • Dey, Aiyesha
  • White, Joshua T.

Abstract

How do firms protect their human capital? We test whether firms facing an increased threat of being acquired strengthen their antitakeover provisions (ATPs) in order to bond with their employees. We use the adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by US state courts, which exogenously decreases knowledge-worker mobility, thus elevating takeover risk and reducing employee incentives to innovate. Firms respond to the IDD adoption by strengthening ATPs that defend against hostile takeovers, especially when they have greater ex-ante employee mobility and human capital and place greater importance on employee relations. We find no evidence that managers strengthen ATPs for entrenchment or takeover bargaining purposes in this setting. Our findings show that ATPs can be used to credibly commit to employees in order to protect long-term value creation.

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  • Dey, Aiyesha & White, Joshua T., 2021. "Labor mobility and antitakeover provisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:71:y:2021:i:2:s0165410121000033
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101388
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Antitakeover provisions; Labor mobility; Implicit contracting; Employee bonding; Stakeholders;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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