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Investors׳ reaction to the use of poison pills as a tax loss preservation tool

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  • Sikes, Stephanie A.
  • Tian, Xiaoli (Shaolee)
  • Wilson, Ryan

Abstract

The recent economic downturn resulted in firms generating significant tax losses, which they risked losing if they experienced an ownership change. In response, a number of loss firms adopted poison pill plans. We document a significant negative market reaction to the announcement of 62 poison pill adoptions related to net operating losses (NOLs), suggesting that in general investors do not consider management׳s claim that the pills are adopted to preserve a valuable tax asset to be credible. However, we find cross-sectional variation consistent with investors considering whether a pill is legitimately adopted to preserve the NOL or to entrench management.

Suggested Citation

  • Sikes, Stephanie A. & Tian, Xiaoli (Shaolee) & Wilson, Ryan, 2014. "Investors׳ reaction to the use of poison pills as a tax loss preservation tool," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 132-148.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:57:y:2014:i:2:p:132-148
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.02.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Aaron J. Mandell, 2022. "The value of tunneling: Evidence from master limited partnership formations," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1-2), pages 355-380, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Taxes; Net operating losses; Poison pills;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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