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Executive pay and "independent" compensation consultants

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  • Murphy, Kevin J.
  • Sandino, Tatiana

Abstract

Executive compensation consultants face potential conflicts of interest that can lead to higher recommended levels of CEO pay, including the desires to "cross-sell" services and to secure "repeat business." We find evidence in both the US and Canada that CEO pay is higher in companies where the consultant provides other services, and that pay is higher in Canadian firms when the fees paid to consultants for other services are large relative to the fees for executive-compensation services. Contrary to expectations, we find that pay is higher in US firms where the consultant works for the board rather than for management.

Suggested Citation

  • Murphy, Kevin J. & Sandino, Tatiana, 2010. "Executive pay and "independent" compensation consultants," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 247-262, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:49:y:2010:i:3:p:247-262
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hsu, Audrey Wen-hsin & Shyu, Yi-Ru & Wang, Victoria Shao-Pin, 2014. "Non-compensation-related consultant service and CEO compensation," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 59-75.
    2. Kabir, Rezaul & Minhat, Marizah, 2014. "Compensation consultants and CEO pay," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 172-189.
    3. Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Mani, Sureshbabu & Ye, Pengfei, 2016. "Relative peer quality and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 196-219.
    4. Sonia Di Giannatale Menegalli & Itza T. Q. Curiel-Cabral, 2013. "Compromises and Incentives," Working Papers DTE 559, CIDE, División de Economía.
    5. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier & Julien Sauvagnat, 2014. "CEO Pay and Firm Size: An Update After the Crisis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(574), pages 40-59, February.
    6. Susanna Gallani, 2015. "Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-019, Harvard Business School, revised Dec 2016.
    7. Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Mani, Sureshbabu & Ye, Pengfei, 2016. "Relative peer quality and firm performance," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 6/2016, Bank of Finland.
    8. Leiby, Justin, 2018. "The role of consultants and management prestige in management control system adoption," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 1-13.
    9. Pieter de Jong & Lakshmi Goel, 2016. "The influence of security analysts on CEO pay cuts," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 13(1), pages 26-52, February.
    10. Jenny Chu & Jonathan Faasse & P. Raghavendra Rau, 2018. "Do Compensation Consultants Enable Higher CEO Pay? A Disclosure Rule Change as a Separating Device," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4915-4935, October.
    11. Jaiswall, Sudhir Shiv Kumar & Bhattacharyya, Asish Kumar, 2016. "Corporate governance and CEO compensation in Indian firms," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 159-175.
    12. Lucas C. Coffman & Alexander Gotthard-Real, 2019. "Moral Perceptions of Advised Actions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(8), pages 3904-3927, August.
    13. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Ittner, Christopher D. & Larcker, David F., 2010. "Corporate Governance, Compensation Consultants, and CEO Pay Levels," Research Papers 2068, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    14. Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Mani, Sureshbabu & Ye, Pengfei, 2016. "Relative peer quality and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 196-219.
    15. Gao, Zhan & Hwang, Yuhchang & Wu, Wan-Ting, 2017. "Contractual features of CEO performance-vested equity compensation," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 282-303.
    16. Divya Anantharaman, 2017. "The role of specialists in financial reporting: Evidence from pension accounting," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 1261-1306, September.
    17. Brown, Paul J & Matolcsy, Zoltan & Wells, Peter, 2014. "Group versus individual compensation schemes for senior executives and firm performance: Some evidence based on archival data," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 100-114.
    18. Steven E. Kaplan & Valentina L. Zamora, 2018. "The Effects of Current Income Attributes on Nonprofessional Investors’ Say-on-Pay Judgments: Does Fairness Still Matter?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 153(2), pages 407-425, December.
    19. Ferri, Fabrizio & Zheng, Ronghuo & Zou, Yuan, 2018. "Uncertainty about managers’ reporting objectives and investors’ response to earnings reports: Evidence from the 2006 executive compensation disclosures," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 339-365.
    20. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2016_006 is not listed on IDEAS

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