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Securities settlements as examples of crisis-driven regulation

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  • Anand, Anita
  • Green, Andrew

Abstract

International bodies have criticized Canadian financial markets for being lax in the area of enforcement. We examine whether such criticisms are applicable to settlements struck by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC). We reach a number of important findings. First, the total number of parties sanctioned and the total amount of payments made to the OSC increased after the 2008 financial crisis, although these numbers decreased in subsequent years. Second, there is no discernible trend in the types of proceedings by which cases were concluded, although the OSC does use settlements more than other provincial regulators. Third, corporations, first-time offenders, and financial service companies are more likely than individuals or repeat offenders to settle and the OSC tends to settle less often when the case involves serious offences such as fraud or manipulation. Finally, penalties imposed as a result of a settlement were not statistically different than those imposed in a hearing. Interestingly, while there are outliers, financial service companies did not pay higher penalties than other parties, nor did repeat offenders although this has recently changed with the introduction of no-contest settlements. Our data support the idea that regulatory activity follows a cyclical pattern and, following a crisis, regulatory activity increases.

Suggested Citation

  • Anand, Anita & Green, Andrew, 2018. "Securities settlements as examples of crisis-driven regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 41-57.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:55:y:2018:i:c:p:41-57
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2018.03.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Switzer, Lorne N. & El Meslmani, Nabil & Zhai, Xinkai, 2022. "IPO performance and the size effect: Evidence for the US and Canada," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).

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