IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v48y2016icp14-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Securities fraud and corporate board turnover: New evidence from lawsuit outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • Baum, Christopher F.
  • Bohn, James G.
  • Chakraborty, Atreya

Abstract

We examine the relationship between outcomes of securities fraud class action lawsuits (SFCAs) and corporate board turnover rates. Our results indicate that turnover rates for board members are higher when a firm settles a lawsuit than when a suit is dismissed. Outside director turnover is most sensitive to SFCA outcomes, perhaps reflecting reputational effects. Results demonstrate that involvement in securities fraud is costly for corporate board members.

Suggested Citation

  • Baum, Christopher F. & Bohn, James G. & Chakraborty, Atreya, 2016. "Securities fraud and corporate board turnover: New evidence from lawsuit outcomes," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 14-25.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:48:y:2016:i:c:p:14-25
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2016.07.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818816300394
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irle.2016.07.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arthur Lewbel & Yingying Dong & Thomas Tao Yang, 2012. "Comparing features of convenient estimators for binary choice models with endogenous regressors," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(3), pages 809-829, August.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "What Works in Securities Laws?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 1-32, February.
    3. Christopher Baum & Yingying Dong & Arthur Lewbel & Tao Yang, 2012. "Binary choice models with endogenous regressors," SAN12 Stata Conference 9, Stata Users Group.
    4. Greg Niehaus & Greg Roth, 1999. "Insider Trading, Equity Issues and CEO Turnover in Firms Subject to Securities Class Actions," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 28(4), Winter.
    5. Denis, David J. & Denis, Diane K. & Sarin, Atulya, 1997. "Ownership structure and top executive turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 193-221, August.
    6. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    7. Suraj Srinivasan, 2005. "Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 291-334, May.
    8. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    9. Agrawal, Anup & Jaffe, Jeffrey F & Karpoff, Jonathan M, 1999. "Management Turnover and Governance Changes following the Revelation of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 309-342, April.
    10. Fich, Eliezer M. & Shivdasani, Anil, 2007. "Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 306-336, November.
    11. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
    12. DuCharme, Larry L. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Sefcik, Stephan E., 2004. "Earnings management, stock issues, and shareholder lawsuits," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 27-49, January.
    13. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    14. Bernard S. Black & Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, 2006. "Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(1), pages 5-20, March.
    15. Tamás Bartus, 2005. "Estimation of marginal effects using margeff," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 5(3), pages 309-329, September.
    16. Jonathan M. Karpoff & D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, 2014. "The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation," Springer Books, in: Roberto Pietra & Stuart McLeay & Joshua Ronen (ed.), Accounting and Regulation, edition 127, chapter 0, pages 339-375, Springer.
    17. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    18. Arthur Lewbel & Yingying Dong & Thomas Tao Yang, 2012. "Viewpoint: Comparing features of convenient estimators for binary choice models with endogenous regressors," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 45(3), pages 809-829, August.
    19. McTier, Brian C. & Wald, John K., 2011. "The causes and consequences of securities class action litigation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 649-665, June.
    20. Rosenstein, Stuart & Wyatt, Jeffrey G., 1990. "Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 175-191, August.
    21. Gong, Guojin & Louis, Henock & Sun, Amy X., 2008. "Earnings management, lawsuits, and stock-for-stock acquirers' market performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 62-77, September.
    22. Eric Helland & Michael Sykuta, 2005. "Who's Monitoring the Monitor? Do Outside Directors Protect Shareholders' Interests?," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 40(2), pages 155-172, May.
    23. Ferris, Stephen P. & Jandik, Tomas & Lawless, Robert M. & Makhija, Anil, 2007. "Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 143-165, March.
    24. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:5:p:2281-2308 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Byrd, John W. & Hickman, Kent A., 1992. "Do outside directors monitor managers? *1: Evidence from tender offer bids," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 195-221, October.
    26. Agrawal, Anup & Chadha, Sahiba, 2005. "Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 371-406, October.
    27. Helland, Eric, 2006. "Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(2), pages 365-395, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Richardson, Grant & Obaydin, Ivan & Liu, Chelsea, 2022. "The effect of accounting fraud on future stock price crash risk," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    2. Monica Ramos Montesdeoca & Agustín J. Sánchez Medina & Felix Blázquez Santana, 2019. "Research Topics in Accounting Fraud in the 21st Century: A State of the Art," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(6), pages 1-31, March.
    3. Street, Daniel A. & Hermanson, Dana R., 2019. "How do restatements affect outside directors and boards? A review of the literature," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 19-46.
    4. Joseph Simpson & Ana Marcie Sariol, 2019. "Squared Away: Veterans on the Board of Directors," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 160(4), pages 1035-1045, December.
    5. Unsal, Omer & Brodmann, Jennifer, 2020. "The impact of employee relations on the reputation of the board of directors and CEO," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 372-388.
    6. Matteo Cotugno & Antonio D'Amato & Angela Gallo & Valeria Stefanelli, 2021. "Do supervisory enforcement actions affect board composition?," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 22-44, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Aharony, Joseph & Liu, Chelsea & Yawson, Alfred, 2015. "Corporate litigation and executive turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 268-292.
    2. Yanmin Gao & Jeong-Bon Kim & Desmond Tsang & Haibin Wu, 2017. "Go before the whistle blows: an empirical analysis of director turnover and financial fraud," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 320-360, March.
    3. Crutchley, Claire E. & Minnick, Kristina & Schorno, Patrick J., 2015. "When governance fails: Naming directors in class action lawsuits," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 81-96.
    4. Beneish, Messod D. & Marshall, Cassandra D. & Yang, Jun, 2017. "Explaining CEO retention in misreporting firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 512-535.
    5. Anup Agrawal & Tommy Cooper, 2017. "Corporate Governance Consequences of Accounting Scandals: Evidence from Top Management, CFO and Auditor Turnover," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(01), pages 1-41, March.
    6. Omer Unsal & Blake Rayfield, 2020. "Corporate governance and employee treatment: evidence from takeover defenses," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 44(2), pages 361-391, April.
    7. Dan Amiram & Zahn Bozanic & James D. Cox & Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff & Richard Sloan, 2018. "Financial reporting fraud and other forms of misconduct: a multidisciplinary review of the literature," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 732-783, June.
    8. Naaraayanan, S. Lakshmi & Nielsen, Kasper Meisner, 2021. "Does personal liability deter individuals from serving as independent directors?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 621-643.
    9. Kathy Fogel & Liping Ma & Randall Morck, 2021. "Powerful independent directors," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(4), pages 935-983, December.
    10. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    11. Jonathan M. Karpoff & D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, 2014. "The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation," Springer Books, in: Roberto Pietra & Stuart McLeay & Joshua Ronen (ed.), Accounting and Regulation, edition 127, chapter 0, pages 339-375, Springer.
    12. Balachandran, Balasingham & Williams, Barry, 2018. "Effective governance, financial markets, financial institutions & crises," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 1-15.
    13. Street, Daniel A. & Hermanson, Dana R., 2019. "How do restatements affect outside directors and boards? A review of the literature," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 19-46.
    14. Huson, Mark R. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Parrino, Robert, 2004. "Managerial succession and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 237-275, November.
    15. Liu, Chelsea & Aharony, Joseph & Richardson, Grant & Yawson, Alfred, 2016. "Corporate litigation and changes in CEO reputation: Guidance from U.S. Federal Court lawsuits," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 15-34.
    16. Panagiotis Staikouras & Christos Staikouras & Maria-Eleni Agoraki, 2007. "The effect of board size and composition on European bank performance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-27, February.
    17. Cline, Brandon N. & Walkling, Ralph A. & Yore, Adam S., 2018. "The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex, lies, and firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 389-415.
    18. Brochet, Francois & Srinivasan, Suraj, 2014. "Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 430-449.
    19. Colonnelli, Emanuele & Lagaras, Spyridon & Ponticelli, Jacopo & Prem, Mounu & Tsoutsoura, Margarita, 2022. "Revealing corruption: Firm and worker level evidence from Brazil," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1097-1119.
    20. Masulis, Ronald W. & Wang, Cong & Xie, Fei, 2012. "Globalizing the boardroom—The effects of foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 527-554.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Securities law; Securities fraud; Board turnover;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:48:y:2016:i:c:p:14-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.