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Forecasting the presidential primary vote: Viability, ideology and momentum

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  • Steger, Wayne P.

Abstract

The presidential primary vote represents a unique electoral forecasting challenge, with multiple candidates and sequential voting. This study compares the leading primary vote forecast models by re-estimating them for a common set of candidates and nomination campaigns. A new forecast model is estimated to assess the predictive power of candidate ideology, controlling for the effects of variables found to be significant in prior studies. Finally, the study compares the early forecasts, based on data from before the Iowa caucus, with "momentum" models, which are the early models, updated with variables representing the results of the Iowa Caucus and New Hampshire Primary vote, predicting the remaining contested primary vote.

Suggested Citation

  • Steger, Wayne P., 2008. "Forecasting the presidential primary vote: Viability, ideology and momentum," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 193-208.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:intfor:v:24:y:2008:i:2:p:193-208
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Norrander, Barbara, 2006. "The Attrition Game: Initial Resources, Initial Contests and the Exit of Candidates During the US Presidential Primary Season," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 487-507, July.
    2. Lawrence Kenny & Babak Lotfinia, 2005. "Evidence on the importance of spatial voting models in presidential nominations and elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 439-462, June.
    3. Aldrich, John H., 1980. "A Dynamic Model of Presidential Nomination Campaigns," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 651-669, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Hummel & Brian Knight, 2015. "Sequential Or Simultaneous Elections? A Welfare Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56(3), pages 851-887, August.
    2. Brian Knight & Nathan Schiff, 2010. "Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(6), pages 1110-1150.
    3. Khan, Urmee & Lieli, Robert P., 2018. "Information flow between prediction markets, polls and media: Evidence from the 2008 presidential primaries," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 696-710.

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