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Real earnings management and debt choice

Author

Listed:
  • Hasan, Mostafa Monzur
  • Alam, Nurul
  • Uddin, Mohammad Riaz
  • Jones, Stewart

Abstract

This study investigates whether real earnings management (RealEM) affects firms’ debt choice. We find that firms with higher RealEM rely more on bank debt than public debt as a source of financing. Our cross-sectional analysis reveals that the RealEM–debt choice association is more significant in the presence of poor corporate governance and heightened financing constraints. We also observe that the connection between RealEM and bank debt is more significant for suspect firms (i.e., firms with a genuine motive for opportunistic earnings management) than their non-suspect counterparts. Additionally, we find that RealEM increases the use of trade credit and short-term debt. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns and other issues. Overall, our findings suggest that the impact of information asymmetry issues arising from RealEM is less for bank than for public debtholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Hasan, Mostafa Monzur & Alam, Nurul & Uddin, Mohammad Riaz & Jones, Stewart, 2024. "Real earnings management and debt choice," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:intfin:v:97:y:2024:i:c:s104244312400146x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2024.102080
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Real earnings management; Information asymmetry; Bank debt;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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