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Innovation in long-term care insurance: Joint contracts for mitigating relational moral hazard

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  • Zweifel, Peter

Abstract

A recent innovation is joint long-term care (LTC) insurance policies covering two related individuals. This contribution purports to find out whether they have the potential of mitigating relational moral hazard (RMH) effects. Intra-family moral hazard has been suspected of being responsible for the sluggish development of private LTC insurance. The parent, anticipating the informal care provided by a family member LTC, is tempted to buy less LTC coverage. The family member (or more generally, the partner of a senior person), knowing that the bequest is protected by LTC insurance, has less incentive to provide informal care. Since a joint LTC policy makes senior and partner decide simultaneously rather than sequentially, it may lead to a partial internalization of RMH effects by turning coverage purchased by the senior and informal care provided by the partner from strategic substitutes into strategic complements under certain conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Zweifel, Peter, 2020. "Innovation in long-term care insurance: Joint contracts for mitigating relational moral hazard," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 116-124.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:insuma:v:93:y:2020:i:c:p:116-124
    DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2020.04.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Huan & Wang, Haiyan & Steffensen, Sonja, 2022. "Mechanism design of multi-strategy health insurance plans under asymmetric information," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Innovation in insurance; Joint contracts; Long-term care insurance; Relational moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination

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