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Insurance bargaining under ambiguity

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  • Huang, Rachel J.
  • Huang, Yi-Chieh
  • Tzeng, Larry Y.

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity in an insurance bargaining game with a risk-and-ambiguity-neutral insurer and a risk-and-ambiguity-averse client. Both a cooperative and a non-cooperative bargaining game are examined. We show that, in both games, full coverage is optimal in the presence of ambiguity, and that the optimal premium is higher in the presence of ambiguity than in the absence of it. Furthermore, the optimal premium will increase with both the degree of ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Rachel J. & Huang, Yi-Chieh & Tzeng, Larry Y., 2013. "Insurance bargaining under ambiguity," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 812-820.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:insuma:v:53:y:2013:i:3:p:812-820
    DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2013.10.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Boonen, Tim J., 2016. "Nash equilibria of Over-The-Counter bargaining for insurance risk redistributions: The role of a regulator," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 250(3), pages 955-965.
    2. Oechssler, Jörg & Roomets, Alex, 2023. "Dissolving an ambiguous partnership," Working Papers 0733, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    3. Jianli Wang & Yingrong Su & Jingyuan Li & Ho Yin Yick, 2022. "Demand for insurance with nonadditive probabilistic beliefs," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(3), pages 854-862, July.
    4. Biener, Christian & Landmann, Andreas & Santana, Maria Isabel, 2019. "Contract nonperformance risk and uncertainty in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 65-83.
    5. Peter, Richard & Ying, Jie, 2020. "Do you trust your insurer? Ambiguity about contract nonperformance and optimal insurance demand," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 938-954.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insurance bargaining; Cooperative bargaining; Non-cooperative bargaining; Ambiguity; Ambiguity aversion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

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