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Exclusivity, competition and the irrelevance of internal investment

Author

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  • de Fontenay, Catherine C.
  • Gans, Joshua S.
  • Groves, Vivienne

Abstract

This paper considers the effect of exclusive contracts on investment decisions in a market with two upstream and two downstream firms. Segal and Whinston's (2000) irrelevance result is generalised and it is shown that exclusive contracts have no effect on the equilibrium level of internal investment for the contracted parties when competition exists in both the upstream and downstream markets. Furthermore, by considering a more competitive environment we are able to demonstrate that strongly internal investment by rival upstream-downstream bargaining pairs is similarly unaffected by the presence of exclusive contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • de Fontenay, Catherine C. & Gans, Joshua S. & Groves, Vivienne, 2010. "Exclusivity, competition and the irrelevance of internal investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 336-340, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:28:y:2010:i:4:p:336-340
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David de Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2004. "Exclusive Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/105, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    2. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    3. Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2005. "Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 544-572, Autumn.
    4. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2000. "Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 603-633, Winter.
    5. David Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2007. "Exclusive contracts foster relationship-specific investment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 85-97, March.
    6. Klein, Benjamin, 1988. "Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 199-213, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kitamura Hiroshi, 2011. "Exclusive Contracts under Financial Constraints," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, September.
    2. Kitamura, Hiroshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Sato, Misato, 2018. "Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 145-167.
    3. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2024. "How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 64(2), pages 219-242, March.
    4. Hiroshi Kitamura & Akira Miyaoka & Misato Sato, 2016. "Relationship-specific investment as a barrier to entry," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 119(1), pages 17-45, September.
    5. Hiroshi Kitamura & Misato Sato & Koki Arai, 2014. "Exclusive contracts when the incumbent can establish a direct retailer," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(1), pages 47-60, May.
    6. Eichberger, Jürgen & Mueller-Langer, Frank, 2012. "On the Welfare Effects of Exclusive Distribution Arrangements," MPRA Paper 39691, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Rudy Douven & Victoria Shestalova & Rein Halbersma & Katalin Katona, 2011. "Vertical integration and exclusive vertical restraints in health-care markets," CPB Discussion Paper 172, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

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