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Optimal franchise contracts with private cost information

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  • Hempelmann, Bernd

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  • Hempelmann, Bernd, 2006. "Optimal franchise contracts with private cost information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 449-465, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:24:y:2006:i:2:p:449-465
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    1. Sugato Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, 1995. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 761-781, Winter.
    2. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    3. Richard E. Romano, 1994. "Double Moral Hazard and Resale Price Maintenance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(3), pages 455-466, Autumn.
    4. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, 1997. "Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 1-25, March.
    5. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1985. "The Economics of Franchise Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 503-526, October.
    6. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    7. Benjamin F. Blair & Tracy R. Lewis, 1994. "Optimal Retail Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 284-296, Summer.
    8. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J. David, 2001. "An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199243273.
    9. Katz, Barbara G. & Joel Owen, 1992. "On the existence of franchise contracts and some of their implications," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 567-593, December.
    10. Rajiv Lal, 1990. "Improving Channel Coordination Through Franchising," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 9(4), pages 299-318.
    11. Gal-Or, Esther, 1991. "Vertical Restraints with Incomplete Information," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 503-516, September.
    12. Melumad, Nahum D. & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1989. "Value of communication in agencies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 334-368, April.
    13. Francine Lafontaine, 1992. "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 263-283, Summer.
    14. Minkler, Alanson P., 1990. "An empirical analysis of a firm's decision to franchise," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 77-82, September.
    15. Gal-Or, Esther, 1991. "Optimal franchising in oligopolistic markets with uncertain demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 343-364, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard S. Brown, 2017. "Franchisor market power and control rights in franchise systems: the case of Major League Baseball versus the Los Angeles Dodgers," Service Business, Springer;Pan-Pacific Business Association, vol. 11(1), pages 1-21, March.
    2. Ackermann, Jeff, 2016. "The Effect of Franchising on Store Performance: Evidence from an Ownership Change," MPRA Paper 76185, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Cintya Lanchimba, 2013. "Optimal Monetary Provisions in Plural Form Franchise Systems ; A Theoretical Model of Incentives with Two Risk-Averse Agents," Working Papers 1321, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    4. Piccolo, Salvatore & Gonzalez, Aldo & Martina, Riccardo, 2014. "Endogenous residual claimancy by vertical hierarchies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 423-427.
    5. Aust, Gerhard & Buscher, Udo, 2014. "Cooperative advertising models in supply chain management: A review," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(1), pages 1-14.
    6. Xiao, Tiaojun & Yang, Danqin, 2009. "Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 196(3), pages 1076-1085, August.
    7. Yao, Dong-Qing & Yue, Xiaohang & Liu, John, 2008. "Vertical cost information sharing in a supply chain with value-adding retailers," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 838-851, October.
    8. Yue Chen & Sai-Ho Chung & Shu Guo, 2020. "Franchising contracts in fashion supply chain operations: models, practices, and real case study," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 291(1), pages 83-128, August.
    9. Liang, Hueimei & Lee, Kuo-Jung & Huang, Jen-Tsung & Lei, Hsien-Wei, 2013. "The optimal decisions in franchising under profit uncertainty," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 128-137.

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