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Equilibrium incentives for most-favored customer clauses in an oligopolistic industry

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  • Besanko, David
  • Lyon, Thomas P.

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  • Besanko, David & Lyon, Thomas P., 1993. "Equilibrium incentives for most-favored customer clauses in an oligopolistic industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 347-367, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:11:y:1993:i:3:p:347-367
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    Cited by:

    1. Walter Beckert & Paolo Siciliani, 2021. "Protecting sticky consumers in essential markets," IFS Working Papers W21/10, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    2. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2010. "Most-Favoured-Customer Pricing and Labour-Managed Oligopoly," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 33-40, March.
    3. Pinar Akman & Morten Hviid, 2005. "A Most-Favoured-Customer Guarantee with a Twist," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2005-08, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    4. Gilo, David & Spiegel, Yossi, 2018. "The antitrust prohibition of excessive pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 503-541.
    5. Maria Goddard & Russell Mannion, 1998. "From competition to co‐operation: new economic relationships in the National Health Service," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(2), pages 105-119, March.
    6. Stephan, Levy, 2004. "Best-price Guarantees as a Quality Signal," MPRA Paper 13466, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Nov 2004.
    7. Klibanoff Peter & Kundu Tapas, 2010. "Monopoly Pricing under a Medicaid-Style Most-Favored-Customer Clause and Its Welfare Implication," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-43, August.
    8. Walter Beckert & Paolo Siciliani, 2018. "Protecting Vulnerable Consumers in "Switching Markets"," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1808, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    9. Patrick Hughes & Margaret Sanderson, 1998. "Conspiracy Law and Jurisprudence in Canada: Towards an Economic Approach," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 13(1), pages 153-176, April.
    10. Walter Beckert & Paolo Siciliani, 2022. "Protecting Sticky Consumers in Essential Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(3), pages 247-278, November.
    11. Dobson, Paul W. & Waterson, Michael, 2003. "Chain-Store Pricing for Strategic Accommodation," Economic Research Papers 269490, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    12. David Besanko & Shana Cui, 2019. "Regulated versus negotiated access pricing in vertically separated railway systems," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 1-32, February.
    13. Spier, Kathryn E., 2001. "The Use of “Most-Favored-Nation” Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt7hm4d39g, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    14. Siciliani, Paolo & Beckert, Walter, 2017. "Spatial models of heterogeneous switching costs," Bank of England working papers 689, Bank of England.
    15. Andre Boik & Kenneth S. Corts, 2016. "The Effects of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on Competition and Entry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 105-134.

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