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Firmware modification attacks on programmable logic controllers

Author

Listed:
  • Basnight, Zachry
  • Butts, Jonathan
  • Lopez, Juan
  • Dube, Thomas

Abstract

Recent attacks on industrial control systems, such as the highly publicized Stuxnet malware, have intensified a “race to the bottom” where lower-level attacks have a tactical advantage. Programmable logic controller (PLC) firmware, which provides a software-driven interface between system inputs and physical outputs, can be easily modified at the user level. Efforts directed at protecting against firmware modification are hindered by the lack of foundational research about attack development and implementation. This paper examines the vulnerability of PLCs to intentional firmware modifications in order to obtain a better understanding of the threats posed by PLC firmware modification attacks and the feasibility of these attacks. A general firmware analysis methodology is presented, and a proof-of-concept experiment is used to demonstrate how legitimate firmware can be updated and uploaded to an Allen-Bradley ControlLogix L61 PLC.

Suggested Citation

  • Basnight, Zachry & Butts, Jonathan & Lopez, Juan & Dube, Thomas, 2013. "Firmware modification attacks on programmable logic controllers," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 76-84.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ijocip:v:6:y:2013:i:2:p:76-84
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijcip.2013.04.004
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Safari, Mohammad & Parvinnia, Elham & Haddad, Alireza Keshavarz, 2021. "Industrial intrusion detection based on the behavior of rotating machine," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 34(C).
    2. Yadav, Geeta & Paul, Kolin, 2021. "Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 34(C).
    3. Zhu, Ruijin & Zhang, Baofeng & Mao, Junjie & Zhang, Quanxin & Tan, Yu-an, 2017. "A methodology for determining the image base of ARM-based industrial control system firmware," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 26-35.
    4. SICARD, Franck & ZAMAI, Éric & FLAUS, Jean-Marie, 2019. "An approach based on behavioral models and critical states distance notion for improving cybersecurity of industrial control systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 584-603.
    5. Schuett, Carl & Butts, Jonathan & Dunlap, Stephen, 2014. "An evaluation of modification attacks on programmable logic controllers," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 61-68.
    6. Monzer, Mohamad-Houssein & Beydoun, Kamal & Ghaith, Alaa & Flaus, Jean-Marie, 2022. "Model-based IDS design for ICSs," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
    7. Barry C. Ezell & R. Michael Robinson & Peter Foytik & Craig Jordan & David Flanagan, 2013. "Cyber risk to transportation, industrial control systems, and traffic signal controllers," Environment Systems and Decisions, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 508-516, December.
    8. Gopal Vishwakarma & Wonjun Lee, 2018. "Exploiting JTAG and Its Mitigation in IOT: A Survey," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 10(12), pages 1-18, December.
    9. adepu, Sridhar & Mathur, Aditya, 2021. "SafeCI: Avoiding process anomalies in critical infrastructure," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 34(C).

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