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Access pricing and exclusionary behavior

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  • Weisman, Dennis L.

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  • Weisman, Dennis L., 2001. "Access pricing and exclusionary behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-126, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:72:y:2001:i:1:p:121-126
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mandy, David M, 2000. "Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 157-172, March.
    2. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Access pricing and competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1673-1710, December.
    4. Sibley, David S. & Weisman, Dennis L., 1998. "Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 451-470, December.
    5. Perry, Martin K., 1989. "Vertical integration: Determinants and effects," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 183-255, Elsevier.
    6. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 73-100, March.
    7. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-150, June.
    8. Economides, Nicholas, 1998. "The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 271-284, May.
    9. David S. Sibley & Michael J. Doane & Michael A. Williams & Shu‐Yi Tsai, 2004. "Pricing Access to a Monopoly Input," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(4), pages 541-555, October.
    10. Weisman, Dennis L, 1995. "Regulation and the Vertically Integrated Firm: The Case of RBOC Entry into Interlata Long Distance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-266, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis Weisman, 2014. "Safe harbor input prices and market exclusion," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 226-236, October.
    2. Joan Calzada & Francesc Trillas, 2005. "The interconnection prices in telecomunications: from theory to practice," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 85-125, June.
    3. James Reitzes, 2008. "Downstream price-cap regulation and upstream market power," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 179-200, April.
    4. Karp, Larry & Perloff, Jeffrey, 2011. "The iPhone Goes Downstream: Mandatory Universal Distribution∗," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt7vc007jh, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    5. Karp, Larry S. & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 2011. "The iPhone goes downstream: mandatory universal distribution," CUDARE Working Papers 123636, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    6. Bustos Alvaro E & Galetovic Alexander, 2009. "Vertical Integration and Sabotage with a Regulated Bottleneck Monopoly," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-52, September.

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