IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/hepoli/v87y2008i3p333-341.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Pharmaceutical companies and Italian Regional Governments: Managing relationships in an increasing institutional complexity

Author

Listed:
  • Compagni, Amelia
  • Cavalli, Laura
  • Jommi, Claudio

Abstract

In Italy, the process of power decentralization to Regional Governments has particularly affected pharmaceutical care policies. Regions are experimenting with various strategies to govern drugs utilization and expenditure, and differentiating their approaches, leading to an ever-changing and complex institutional scenario. Pharmaceutical companies have created new professional roles, the Regional Affairs Managers (RAM), with the mandate to monitor the different regional contexts and measures, and to establish relationships with the public actors in charge of pharmaceutical policies. This analysis shows how public affairs/lobbying actions at regional level and the creation of a solid political competence within companies are still in an early phase. The activities carried out by RAMs remain limited to an exchange of information and only rarely are perceived by Regional public servants (RRs) as giving support to their work or influence decisions. The interaction with RAMs is often seen as little relevant and still too concentrated on products and a marketing/commercial approach rather than on broader issues of interest to RRs who need to manage the pharmaceutical care system at large. The level of acceptance of this type of activity is also variable and RRs' attitudes alternate between diffidence, polite tolerance, and openness to a constructive dialogue about pharmaceuticals and their management in a regional healthcare system.

Suggested Citation

  • Compagni, Amelia & Cavalli, Laura & Jommi, Claudio, 2008. "Pharmaceutical companies and Italian Regional Governments: Managing relationships in an increasing institutional complexity," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 87(3), pages 333-341, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:87:y:2008:i:3:p:333-341
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168-8510(08)00057-2
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Salamon, Lester M. & Siegfried, John J., 1977. "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 1026-1043, September.
    2. Austen-Smith, David, 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Access," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(3), pages 566-581, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Romero, Jorge A., 2022. "Lobbying and political expenses: Complements or substitutes?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 558-575.
    2. Francis,David C. & Kubinec ,Robert, 2022. "Beyond Political Connections : A Measurement Model Approach to Estimating Firm-levelPolitical Influence in 41 Economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10119, The World Bank.
    3. Gregor Martin, 2015. "To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 143-166, July.
    4. Behnam Karamshahi & Zeinab Azami & Tabandeh Salehi, 2018. "The association between competition power in markets and tax avoidance: evidence from Tehran stock exchange," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 8(3), pages 323-339, September.
    5. Paul H. Rubin & Mark A. Cohen, 1992. "Politically Imposed Entry Barriers," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 333-344, Summer.
    6. Brian Kelleher Richter & Krislert Samphantharak & Jeffrey F. Timmons, 2009. "Lobbying and Taxes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 893-909, October.
    7. Cotton, Christopher, 2015. "Competing for Attention," MPRA Paper 65715, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Ted Hayduk, 2022. "Association membership, election cycles, and political donation patterns," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 359-384, December.
    9. Sverker Sikström & Laura Mai Stoinski & Kristina Karlsson & Lotta Stille & Johan Willander, 2020. "Weighting power by preference eliminates gender differences," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(11), pages 1-19, November.
    10. Richard Damania & Per G. Fredriksson & Thomas Osang, 2005. "Polluters and Collective Action: Theory and Evidence," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(1), pages 167-185, July.
    11. Lagerlof, Johan & Frisell, Lars, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation," CEPR Discussion Papers 4313, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Luca Lambertini, 2014. "Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign," Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance, in: Josef Haunschmied & Vladimir M. Veliov & Stefan Wrzaczek (ed.), Dynamic Games in Economics, edition 127, pages 187-204, Springer.
    13. Matata Ponyo Mapon & Jean-Paul K. Tsasa, 2019. "The artefact of the Natural Resources Curse," Papers 1911.09681, arXiv.org.
    14. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, 2013. "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 19698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. repec:zbw:bofitp:2013_006 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Dane M. Christensen & Hengda Jin & Suhas A. Sridharan & Laura A. Wellman, 2022. "Hedging on the Hill: Does Political Hedging Reduce Firm Risk?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(6), pages 4356-4379, June.
    17. Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2003. "Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Vienna Economics Papers vie0315, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    18. Hilber, Christian A.L. & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2013. "On the origins of land use regulations: Theory and evidence from US metro areas," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 29-43.
    19. Hua Cheng & Kishore Gawande & Steven Ongena & Shusen Qi, 2020. "Get beyond policy uncertainty: Evidence from political connections," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 20-77, Swiss Finance Institute.
    20. Cotton, Christopher, 2009. "Should we tax or cap political contributions? A lobbying model with policy favors and access," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 831-842, August.
    21. Marianne Bertrand & Matilde Bombardini & Raymond Fisman & Brad Hackinen & Francesco Trebbi, 2021. "Hall of Mirrors: Corporate Philanthropy and Strategic Advocacy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 136(4), pages 2413-2465.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:87:y:2008:i:3:p:333-341. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/healthpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.