Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Nonequivalence to Competitive Equilibria
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- Hart, S. & Mas-Colell, A., 1993. "Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Non Equivalence to Competitive Equilibria," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 9, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008.
"Cooperative Games in Strategic Form,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp484, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Cooperative games in strategic form," Economics Working Papers 1094, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Cooperative Games in Strategic Form," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002406, David K. Levine.
- Arnold Polanski & Emiliya Lazarova, 2015.
"Dynamic multilateral markets,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 815-833, November.
- Arnold Polanski & Emiliya A. Lazarova, 2011. "Dynamic Multilateral Markets," Working Papers 2011.44, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Arnold Polanski & Emiliya A. Lazarova, 2013. "Dynamic Multilateral Markets," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 039, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Polanski, Arnold & Lazarova, Emiliya A., 2011. "Dynamic Multilateral Markets," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 108255, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Gomes, Armando & Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1999.
"Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 204-228, May.
- Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Game Theory and Information 9705003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field," Economics Working Papers 241, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Emilio Calvo, 2008.
"Random marginal and random removal values,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 37(4), pages 533-563, December.
- Calvo, Emilio, 2006. "Random Marginal and Random Removal values," MPRA Paper 142, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002205, David K. Levine.
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