IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/forpol/v18y2012icp38-45.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Can “fragile states” decide to reduce their deforestation? The inappropriate use of the theory of incentives with respect to the REDD mechanism

Author

Listed:
  • Karsenty, Alain
  • Ongolo, Symphorien

Abstract

The originality of the REDD proposal is its incentives-based mechanism designed to reward the governments of developing countries for their performance in reducing deforestation as measured against a baseline. This mechanism is founded on the hypothesis that developing countries ‘pay’ an opportunity cost to conserve their forests and would prefer other choices and convert their wooden lands to other uses. The basic idea is, therefore, to pay rents to these countries to compensate for the anticipated foregone revenues. The reference to the theory of incentives (in its principal–agent version) is implicit but clear. In this REDD-related framework, the Government is taken as any economic agent who behaves rationally i.e. taking decisions after comparing the relative prices associated to various alternatives, then deciding to take action and implementing effective measures to tackle deforestation and shift the nation-wide development path.

Suggested Citation

  • Karsenty, Alain & Ongolo, Symphorien, 2012. "Can “fragile states” decide to reduce their deforestation? The inappropriate use of the theory of incentives with respect to the REDD mechanism," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 38-45.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:18:y:2012:i:c:p:38-45
    DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389934111000748
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Collier & David Dollar, 2004. "Development effectiveness: what have we learnt?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(496), pages 244-271, June.
    2. Collier, Paul & Guillaumont, Patrick & Guillaumont, Sylviane & Gunning, Jan Willem, 1997. "Redesigning conditionality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(9), pages 1399-1407, September.
    3. Cernea, Michael M. & Schmidt-Soltau, Kai, 2006. "Poverty Risks and National Parks: Policy Issues in Conservation and Resettlement," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 1808-1830, October.
    4. McCarthy, John F., 2004. "Changing to Gray: Decentralization and the Emergence of Volatile Socio-Legal Configurations in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 1199-1223, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Temple, Jonathan R.W., 2010. "Aid and Conditionality," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4415-4523, Elsevier.
    2. William Easterly, 2009. "Can the West Save Africa?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 373-447, June.
    3. Theocharis Grigoriadis, 2013. "Aid effectiveness and imperfect monitoring: EU development aid as Prisoner’s Dilemma," Rationality and Society, , vol. 25(4), pages 489-511, November.
    4. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
    5. Jaromír Harmáček & Miroslav Syrovátka & Zdeněk Opršal, 2017. "Analýza faktorů selekce a alokace české rozvojové pomoci s využitím panelových dat a metod Probit a Tobit [Factors of Czech Aid Selection and Allocation: Panel Probit and Tobit Analysis]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2017(2), pages 179-197.
    6. Thapa Karki, Shova & Hubacek, Klaus, 2015. "Developing a conceptual framework for the attitude–intention–behaviour links driving illegal resource extraction in Bardia National Park, Nepal," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 129-139.
    7. Joseph Forson, 2015. "Corruption, EU Aid Inflows and Economic Growth in Ghana: Cointegration and Causality Analysis," Managing Intellectual Capital and Innovation for Sustainable and Inclusive Society: Managing Intellectual Capital and Innovation; Proceedings of the MakeLearn and TIIM Joint International Conference 2,, ToKnowPress.
    8. Ide, Tobias, 2020. "The dark side of environmental peacebuilding," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    9. Guillaumont, Patrick & Jeanneney, Sylviane Guillaumont & Brun, Jean-Francois, 1999. "How Instability Lowers African Growth," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 8(1), pages 87-107, March.
    10. Patrick GUILLAUMONT, 2008. "Adapting Aid Allocation Criteria to Development Goals," Working Papers P01, FERDI.
    11. Mark McGillivray, 2006. "Aid Allocation and Fragile States," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2006-01, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    12. Dierk Herzer & Michael Grimm, 2012. "Does foreign aid increase private investment? Evidence from panel cointegration," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(20), pages 2537-2550, July.
    13. Jagger, Pamela, 2014. "Confusion vs. clarity: Property rights and forest use in Uganda," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 32-41.
    14. Long, Hexing & de Jong, Wil & Yiwen, Zhang & Liu, Jinlong, 2021. "Institutional choices between private management and user group management during forest devolution: A case study of forest allocation in China," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    15. Sayuni B. Mariki, 2013. "Conservation With a Human Face? Comparing Local Participation and Benefit Sharing From a National Park and a State Forest Plantation in Tanzania," SAGE Open, , vol. 3(4), pages 21582440135, November.
    16. J. Vernon Henderson & Yong Suk Lee, 2015. "Organization of Disaster Aid Delivery: Spending Your Donations," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(4), pages 617-664.
    17. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura, 2007. "IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 640-666, November.
    18. Ali, Murad, 2017. "Implementing the 2030 Agenda in Pakistan: the critical role of an enabling environment in the mobilisation of domestic and external resources," IDOS Discussion Papers 14/2017, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).
    19. Verbrugge, Boris, 2015. "Decentralization, Institutional Ambiguity, and Mineral Resource Conflict in Mindanao, Philippines," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 449-460.
    20. Lodewijk Smets & Stephen Knack, 2016. "World Bank Lending and the Quality of Economic Policy," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(1), pages 72-91, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:18:y:2012:i:c:p:38-45. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.