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Avoiding legality: Timber producers’ strategies and motivations under FLEGT in Ghana and Indonesia

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  • Acheampong, Emmanuel
  • Maryudi, Ahmad

Abstract

Large-scale illegal logging and associated trade in illegally sourced wood products are recognized as pervasive drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in many developing countries. To address the problems, the European Union (EU) adopted the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan in 2003 with the Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) and the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) as key components. Following the introduction of these initiatives, concerns have been raised about the potential of timber producers to avoid the new legality requirements. Based on interviews with timber actors in Ghana and Indonesia, this paper explores the practices of timber producers, identifying various strategies they undertake to circumvent timber legality requirements. It also explores their motivations for doing so. The study found that timber legality verification presents challenges to timber producers in Ghana and Indonesia. They therefore engage in a number of practices to avoid timber legality. These practices entail a range of actions that bypass EU market legality requirements and/or domestic laws. Motivations included instrumental, normative and contextual factors, such as the costs associated with complying with the legality requirements, and the perception that the new regulations are overly burdensome. Moreover, for many operators, there is the feeling that timber legality as it is unfolding in the countries is an imposition that fails to take into account local realities; as such, evading legality becomes a legitimate response. Through their focus on legal formalisation and strengthened enforcement, the VPA and EUTR implicitly stipulate an instrumental perspective to compliance. The paper, therefore, contends that, for the FLEGT Action Plan to achieve its objective of addressing illegal logging and, ultimately, deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, FLEGT policy makers and implementers must also pay attention to the normative and contextual factors of compliance.

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  • Acheampong, Emmanuel & Maryudi, Ahmad, 2020. "Avoiding legality: Timber producers’ strategies and motivations under FLEGT in Ghana and Indonesia," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:111:y:2020:i:c:s1389934118304441
    DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2019.102047
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Arts, Bas & Heukels, Bas & Turnhout, Esther, 2021. "Tracing timber legality in practice: The case of Ghana and the EU," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    5. Adams, Marshall Alhassan & Kayira, Jean & Tegegne, Yitagesu Tekle & Gruber, James S., 2020. "A comparative analysis of the institutional capacity of FLEGT VPA in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, and the Republic of the Congo," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    6. Tegegne, Yitagesu Tekle & Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta & Kotilainen, Juha & Winkel, Georg & Haywood, Andrew & Almaw, Addisu, 2022. "What drives forest rule compliance behaviour in the Congo Basin? A study of local communities in Cameroon," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    7. Prasada, Imade Yoga & Nugroho, Agus Dwi & Lakner, Zoltan, 2022. "Impact of the FLEGT license on Indonesian plywood competitiveness in the European Union," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).

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