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Grants for advisory services in the private Danish forestry sector - A principal-agent approach

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  • Vedel, Suzanne E.
  • Lund, Dorthe H.
  • Jacobsen, Jette B.
  • Helles, Finn

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  • Vedel, Suzanne E. & Lund, Dorthe H. & Jacobsen, Jette B. & Helles, Finn, 2006. "Grants for advisory services in the private Danish forestry sector - A principal-agent approach," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 185-199, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:foreco:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:185-199
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J. David, 2001. "An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199243273.
    2. Rob Hart, 2005. "Combating moral hazard in agri-environmental schemes: a multiple-agent approach," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 32(1), pages 75-91, March.
    3. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    4. Krepps, Matthew B. & Caves, Richard E., 1994. "Bureaucrats and Indians: Principal-agent relations and efficient management of tribal forest resources," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 133-151, July.
    5. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    6. Mark Armstrong & David E. M. Sappington, 2004. "Toward a Synthesis of Models of Regulatory Policy Design with Limited Information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 5-21, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Sen & Bogle, Tim & van Kooten, G. Cornelis, 2012. "Forestry and the New Institutional Economics," Working Papers 130818, University of Victoria, Resource Economics and Policy.
    2. Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl & Jellesmark Thorsen, Bo, 6. "First Movers, Non Movers and Social Gains from Supporting Entry in Markets for Nature-Based Recreational Goods," Scandinavian Forest Economics: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics, Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics, issue 42, April.
    3. Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl, 2009. "First-movers, non-movers, and social gains from subsidising entry in markets for nature-based recreational goods," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(8-9), pages 2363-2371, June.

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