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Independent directors' performance behavior and corporate violations

Author

Listed:
  • Zhao, Jing
  • Zhao, Liang
  • Tan, Haoyu
  • Li, Huxing

Abstract

Using data from A-share listed companies as a sample for an empirical analysis, this study confirms the link between the performance behavior of independent directors (IDs) and corporate violations. Empirical research has found that the higher the participation rate of IDs on a company's board of directors is, the more it can reduce the company's irregularities. Furthermore, IDs’ competence negatively moderates the relationship between attendance at meetings and corporate irregularities: The ability of IDs to perform their duties negatively moderates the relationship between IDs’ issuance of dissenting acts and corporate violations.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhao, Jing & Zhao, Liang & Tan, Haoyu & Li, Huxing, 2024. "Independent directors' performance behavior and corporate violations," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(PB).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:69:y:2024:i:pb:s1544612324011486
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.106119
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Independent directors; Performance of duties; Corporate violations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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