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Liquidation threat: Behavior of CEO entrenchment

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  • Lee, Chien-Chiang
  • Wang, Chih-Wei

Abstract

This study investigated the effect of CEO entrenchment on a firm's debt maturity choice. We examine US firms using the 2006–2017 sample period and find that entrenched managers choose debt with longer maturity financing to avoid early liquidation. Additionally, we detect a possible channel between entrenchment and debt maturity using shareholder-initiated proposals. Finally, firms with high (low) informational opacity (credit quality) will force entrenched managers to extend their debt maturity. We provide useful policy implications for shareholders and investors and new insights into CEO entrenchment, debt maturity, and shareholder-initiated proposals.

Suggested Citation

  • Lee, Chien-Chiang & Wang, Chih-Wei, 2022. "Liquidation threat: Behavior of CEO entrenchment," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(PA).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:47:y:2022:i:pa:s1544612322002094
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2022.102949
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lee, Chien-Chiang & Wang, Chih-Wei & Wu, Yu-Ching, 2023. "CEO inside debt and downside risk: Evidence from internal and external environments," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    2. Amin, Md Ruhul & Mazumder, Sharif & Aktas, Elvan, 2023. "Busy board and corporate debt maturity structure," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    3. Lee, Chien-Chiang & Wang, Chih-Wei & Xu, Zhi-Ting, 2023. "Signaling effect of cash holdings adjustment before bond issuance," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).

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