IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finlet/v30y2019icp216-220.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Effects of CEO miscalibration on compensation and hedging

Author

Listed:
  • Kim, Hwa-Sung

Abstract

Empirical evidence shows that CEOs are miscalibrated in that they underestimate market risk. We use a standard principal-agent model to investigate how CEO miscalibration influences compensation and hedging. CEOs hedge less as the level of CEO miscalibration increases. Consistent with the CEO miscalibration-compensation literature, the pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to CEO miscalibration. Further, our model predicts that the sensitivity of compensation to CEO miscalibration increases when it is more costly for miscalibrated CEOs to hedge market risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Hwa-Sung, 2019. "Effects of CEO miscalibration on compensation and hedging," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 216-220.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:30:y:2019:i:c:p:216-220
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2018.10.007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612318303362
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.frl.2018.10.007?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gao, Huasheng, 2010. "Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 218-238, August.
    2. Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, 2005. "CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2661-2700, December.
    3. Baker, Malcolm & Wurgler, Jeffrey, 2013. "Behavioral Corporate Finance: An Updated Survey," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 357-424, Elsevier.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    5. Itzhak Ben-David & John R. Graham, 2013. "Managerial Miscalibration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(4), pages 1547-1584.
    6. Anand M. Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, 2008. "Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(6), pages 2737-2784, December.
    7. Otto, Clemens A., 2014. "CEO optimism and incentive compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 366-404.
    8. Hackbarth, Dirk, 2008. "Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(4), pages 843-881, December.
    9. Clemens A. Otto, 2014. "CEO optimism and incentive compensation," Post-Print hal-01097589, HAL.
    10. Simon Gervais & J. B. Heaton & Terrance Odean, 2011. "Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1735-1777, October.
    11. Humphery-Jenner, Mark & Lisic, Ling Lei & Nanda, Vikram & Silveri, Sabatino Dino, 2016. "Executive overconfidence and compensation structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 533-558.
    12. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    13. Gerald Garvey & Todd Milbourn, 2003. "Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1557-1582, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kaplan, Steven N. & Sørensen, Morten & Zakolyukina, Anastasia A., 2022. "What is CEO overconfidence? Evidence from executive assessments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 409-425.
    2. Ge, Li & Jamil, Taher & Yu, Jin, 2024. "CEO overconfidence and the choice of debt issuance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    3. Li, Si & Perez, M. Fabricio, 2021. "The evolution of pay premiums for managerial attributes," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    4. Lin, Tse-Chun & Pursiainen, Vesa, 2023. "Gender differences in reward-based crowdfunding," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    5. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2019_018 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Li, Delong & Lu, Lei & Mu, Congming & Yang, Jinqiang, 2019. "Biased beliefs, costly external finance, and firm behavior : A Unified theory," Research Discussion Papers 18/2019, Bank of Finland.
    7. Chen, Sheng-Syan & Peng, Shu-Cing & Yeh, Chia-Wei, 2023. "Does import competition from China discipline overconfident CEOs in U.S. firms?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 277-297.
    8. Lai, Shaojie & Li, Xiaorong & Chan, Kam C., 2021. "CEO overconfidence and labor investment efficiency," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    9. Mao-Wei Hung & Wen-Hsin Tsai, 2020. "Managerial optimism, CEO retention, and corporate performance: evidence from bankruptcy-filing firms," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 44(3), pages 506-527, July.
    10. Cook, Douglas O. & Chowdhury, Jaideep & Zhang, Weiwei, 2023. "Director optimism and CEO equity compensation," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 143-162.
    11. Otto, Clemens A., 2014. "CEO optimism and incentive compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 366-404.
    12. Lee, Jin-Ping & Lin, Edward M.H. & Lin, James Juichia & Zhao, Yang, 2020. "Bank systemic risk and CEO overconfidence," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    13. Tim R. Adam & Valentin Burg & Tobias Scheinert & Daniel Streitz, 2020. "Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design: The Case of Syndicated Loans," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 352-375, January.
    14. Ulrike Malmendier & Vincenzo Pezone & Hui Zheng, 2023. "Managerial Duties and Managerial Biases," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3174-3201, June.
    15. Marius Guenzel & Ulrike Malmendier, 2020. "Behavioral Corporate Finance: The Life Cycle of a CEO Career," NBER Working Papers 27635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Malmendier, Ulrike M. & Guenzel, Marius, 2020. "Behavioral Corporate Finance: The Life Cycle of a CEO Career," CEPR Discussion Papers 15103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Li, Delong & Lu, Lei & Mu, Congming & Yang, Jinqiang, 2019. "Biased beliefs, costly external finance, and firm behavior: A Unified theory," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 18/2019, Bank of Finland.
    18. Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2022. "Do Firms Gain from Managerial Overconfidence? The Role of Severance Pay," CESifo Working Paper Series 9801, CESifo.
    19. Athanasakou, Vasiliki & Ferreira, Daniel & Goh, Lisa, 2022. "Changes in CEO stock option grants: a look at the numbers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115609, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    20. Gurdgiev, Constantin & Ni, Qiuxin, 2023. "Board diversity: Moderating effects of CEO overconfidence on firm financing decisions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C).
    21. Athanasakou, Vasiliki & Ferreira, Daniel & Goh, Lisa, 2022. "Changes in CEO stock option grants: A look at the numbers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO miscalibration; Compensation; Hedging;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:30:y:2019:i:c:p:216-220. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/frl .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.