IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finana/v91y2024ics1057521923005227.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The impact of high-pressure political reforms on state-owned enterprises: Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Bae, Sung C.
  • Kwon, Taek Ho
  • Liu, Chenyang

Abstract

Taking the case of high-pressure political reforms including the ongoing anti-corruption campaign in China, we investigate the impact of such reforms on the performance of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the agency problem perspective. We report that before the reforms, SOEs significantly underperform non-SOEs in most performance measures, consistent with the existing evidence. Following the reforms, however, the performance gaps between SOEs and non-SOEs become insignificant or even reversed. Our results of positive impacts of the reforms on overall performance, cost control, operating efficiency and cash positions and their negative impacts on investment levels and efficiency for SOEs are in supportive of our hypotheses based on the agency theory. We further find that the state as SOEs' controlling shareholder is the primary beneficiary of the reforms through higher tax collections from SOEs, though incurring a loss in shareholder stock returns. We also report a few cases of industry heterogeneity in the impacts. Our results lend strong evidence that the political reforms empower the state to deter SOEs' corrupt practices and align their business decisions with the state's political objectives mainly by mitigating agency problems in Chinese SOEs.

Suggested Citation

  • Bae, Sung C. & Kwon, Taek Ho & Liu, Chenyang, 2024. "The impact of high-pressure political reforms on state-owned enterprises: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:91:y:2024:i:c:s1057521923005227
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.103006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521923005227
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irfa.2023.103006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mi, Zhou & Wang, Xiaoming, 2000. "Agency cost and the crisis of China's SOE," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 297-317.
    2. Xiaping Cao & Michael Lemmon & Xiaofei Pan & Meijun Qian & Gary Tian, 2019. "Political Promotion, CEO Incentives, and the Relationship Between Pay and Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(7), pages 2947-2965, July.
    3. Xu, Gang & Yano, Go, 2017. "How does anti-corruption affect corporate innovation? Evidence from recent anti-corruption efforts in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 498-519.
    4. Thomas W. Bates & Kathleen M. Kahle & René M. Stulz, 2009. "Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash than They Used To?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 1985-2021, October.
    5. Allen, Franklin & Qian, Jun & Qian, Meijun, 2005. "Law, finance, and economic growth in China," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 57-116, July.
    6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    7. Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine & Alexey Levkov, 2010. "Big Bad Banks? The Winners and Losers from Bank Deregulation in the United States," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(5), pages 1637-1667, October.
    8. James S. Ang & Rebel A. Cole & James Wuh Lin, 2000. "Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 81-106, February.
    9. Akie Iriyama & Rajiv Kishore & Debabrata Talukdar, 2016. "Playing dirty or building capability? Corruption and HR training as competitive actions to threats from informal and foreign firm rivals," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(10), pages 2152-2173, October.
    10. Joseph D. Piotroski & T. J. Wong & Tianyu Zhang, 2015. "Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 405-459, May.
    11. Ann Harrison & Marshall Meyer & Peichun Wang & Linda Zhao & Minyuan Zhao, 2019. "Can a Tiger Change Its Stripes? Reform of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in the Penumbra of the State," NBER Working Papers 25475, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2008. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 213-218, Springer.
    13. Nguyet Thi Minh Phi & Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary & Chuc Anh Tu & Naoyuki Yoshino & Chul Ju Kim, 2021. "Performance Differential between Private and State-owned Enterprises: An Analysis of Profitability and Solvency," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(14), pages 3913-3928, November.
    14. Mariassunta Giannetti & Guanmin Liao & Jiaxing You & Xiaoyun Yu, 2021. "The Externalities of Corruption: Evidence from Entrepreneurial Firms in China," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 25(3), pages 629-667.
    15. Kong, Dongmin & Tao, Yunqing & Wang, Yanan, 2020. "China's anti-corruption campaign and firm productivity: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    16. Michael I. Cragg & I. J. Alexander Dyck, 2003. "Privatization and Management Incentives: Evidence from the United Kingdom," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 176-217, April.
    17. ChungMing Lau & Yuan Lu & Qiang Liang, 2016. "Corporate Social Responsibility in China: A Corporate Governance Approach," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 73-87, June.
    18. Bartram, Söhnke M. & Hou, Kewei & Kim, Sehoon, 2022. "Real effects of climate policy: Financial constraints and spillovers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(2), pages 668-696.
    19. Bradshaw, Mark & Liao, Guanmin & Ma, Mark (Shuai), 2019. "Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major Shareholder," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 255-277.
    20. K. Hung Chan & Phyllis L. L. Mo & Amy Y. Zhou & Steven Cahan, 2013. "Government ownership, corporate governance and tax aggressiveness: evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 53(4), pages 1029-1051, December.
    21. Jiang, Kun & Wang, Susheng, 2012. "Staged privatization: A market process with multistage lockups," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1051-1070.
    22. Kim, Daniel S. & Li, Yun & Tarzia, Domenico, 2018. "Value of corruption in China: Evidence from anti-corruption investigation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 112-116.
    23. Kun Jiang & Susheng Wang, 2016. "Staged Privatization: Transforming State-Owned Enterprises into Market-Based Firms," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(4), pages 694-726, December.
    24. Yan-Leung Cheung & P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, 2010. "Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Central vs. Local Government Shareholders in Chinese Listed Firms," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 14(4), pages 669-694.
    25. Ms. Anja Baum & Mr. Paulo A Medas & Alberto Soler & Mouhamadou Sy, 2020. "Managing Fiscal Risks from State-Owned Enterprises," IMF Working Papers 2020/213, International Monetary Fund.
    26. Aguilera, Ruth & Duran, Patricio & Heugens, P.P.M.A.R. & Sauerwald, Steve & Turturea, Roxana & VanEssen, Marc, 2021. "State ownership, political ideology, and firm performance around the world," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(1).
    27. Miguel A. Ferreira & Antonio S. Vilela, 2004. "Why Do Firms Hold Cash? Evidence from EMU Countries," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 10(2), pages 295-319, June.
    28. Singh, Manohar & Davidson III, Wallace N., 2003. "Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 793-816, May.
    29. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
    30. Michael Firth & Peter M. Y. Fung & Oliver M. Rui, 2006. "Firm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top Management Turnover in a Transitional Economy," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(6), pages 1289-1330, September.
    31. Li, Xiaoxia & Cai, Guilong & Luo, Danglun, 2020. "GDP distortion and tax avoidance in local SOEs: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 582-598.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kong, Dongmin & Zhu, Ling & Wang, Xin, 2022. "Anti-corruption and CEO compensation: Evidence from a natural experiment in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    2. Feng, Qianbin & Hu, Xiao & Deng, Xinyi & Lu, Jun, 2023. "Anti-corruption campaign and capacity utilization of state-owned enterprises: Evidence from China’s central committee inspection," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 319-346.
    3. Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A Kim, 2020. "Corporate Governance in China: A Survey [The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: a conceptual framework and survey]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(4), pages 733-772.
    4. Lou, Xu & Qian, Aimin & Zhang, Chenyu, 2021. "Do CEO's political promotion incentives influence the value of cash holdings: Evidence from state-owned enterprises in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    5. Wu, Kai & Liu, Jiming, 2022. "Purifying political ecology: How anti-corruption campaign affects capital structure decisions?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    6. Kong, Gaowen & Huang, Jiating & Ma, Guangyuan, 2023. "Anti-corruption and within-firm pay gap: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    7. Deng, Jiapin & Lu, Di, 2024. "The Old Boys’ Club and Board Gender Diversity: Evidence from the Anti-corruption Campaign in China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 626-656.
    8. Ali, Muhammad Jahangir & Biswas, Pallab Kumar & Chapple, Larelle & Kumarasinghe, Sriyalatha, 2024. "Institutional ownership and earnings quality: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    9. Boubaker, Sabri & Liu, Pei-Zhi & Ren, Yi-Shuai & Ma, Chao-Qun, 2024. "Do anti-corruption campaigns affect corporate environmental responsibility? Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    10. Lin, Ling & Xiao, Min & Yao, Rongrong & Zhang, Xiaoying, 2024. "Product market liberalization and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    11. Amess, Kevin & Banerji, Sanjay & Lampousis, Athanasios, 2015. "Corporate cash holdings: Causes and consequences," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 421-433.
    12. Li, Guangzi & Chan, Kam C., 2021. "Anti-corruption intensity and loan contracting: Evidence from non-state owned firms in China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    13. Wenwu Cai & Xiaofeng Quan & Gary Gang Tian, 2023. "Local Corruption and Trade Credit: Evidence from an Emerging Market," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 185(3), pages 563-594, July.
    14. Xu, Weidong & Luo, Zijun & Li, Donghui, 2024. "Investor–firm interactions and corporate investment efficiency: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    15. Kong, Dongmin & Shu, Yijia & Wang, Yanan, 2021. "Corruption and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China⋆," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    16. Xingqiang Du, 2013. "Does Religion Matter to Owner-Manager Agency Costs? Evidence from China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 118(2), pages 319-347, December.
    17. Wang, Xiaoyu & Long, Zhineng & Zhao, Xiangfang, 2024. "Merchant guild culture and cash holdings: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    18. Yang, Junhong & Guariglia, Alessandra & Guo, Jie (Michael), 2019. "To what extent does corporate liquidity affect M&A decisions, method of payment and performance? Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 128-152.
    19. Zhao, Yujie & Zhou, Donghua & Zhao, Kangsheng & Zhou, Ping, 2019. "Is the squeaky wheel getting the grease? Earnings management and government subsidies," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 297-312.
    20. Li, Xiafei & Luo, Di, 2020. "Increase in cash holdings of U.S. firms: The role of healthcare and technology industries," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 286-298.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    High-pressure political reforms; State-owned enterprises; Anti-corruption campaign; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:91:y:2024:i:c:s1057521923005227. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620166 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.