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Changes in corporate governance: Externally dictated vs voluntarily determined

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  • Tosun, Onur Kemal

Abstract

Using the 2003 SEC regulations (following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act) on board independence as an identification for externally imposed governance changes, I compare its influence on firm performance to the effect of voluntarily conducted adjustments. I use publicly listed US firms between 1998 and 2009. In a triple-difference (dif-in-dif-in-dif) analysis setting, I explicitly interact the dictated change in board independence with the identifiers of the shock and non-compliant firms. Controlling for companies with voluntary changes, firms forced to modify their governance by increasing board independence experience a decrease in ROA, asset turnover, and sales growth. Testing the joint influence of dictated and voluntary adjustments in board independence on performance through a cross-sectional logistic-regression model, and controlling further for potential endogeneity through an instrumental variable (IV) regression model, I obtain consistent results. The findings are robust for other mandated provisions and stronger for bigger changes; small, single-segment firms operating in wholesale, retail, and high-tech industries; and constrained companies with financial distress, high leverage, low cash, high volatility, high growth and R&D expenses.

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  • Tosun, Onur Kemal, 2021. "Changes in corporate governance: Externally dictated vs voluntarily determined," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:73:y:2021:i:c:s1057521920302519
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101608
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    4. Chen Anqi & Ong Tze San, 2022. "Environmental Performance, Corporate Governance and Financial Performance of Chinese Heavy Polluted Industries," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 12(3), pages 460-469, May.
    5. Ahmad, Sardar & Ullah, Subhan & Akbar, Saeed & Kodwani, Devendra & Brahma, Sanjukta, 2024. "The impact of compliance, board committees and insider CEOs on firm survival during crisis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Imposed regulations; Voluntary governance changes; Firm performance; Board independence; Identification;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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