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Early evidence of an adverse selection death spiral? The case of Blue Cross and Blue Shield

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  • Thomasson, Melissa A.

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  • Thomasson, Melissa A., 2004. "Early evidence of an adverse selection death spiral? The case of Blue Cross and Blue Shield," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 313-328, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:41:y:2004:i:4:p:313-328
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas Buchmueller & John Dinardo, 2002. "Did Community Rating Induce an Adverse Selection Death Spiral? Evidence from New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 280-294, March.
    2. Melissa A. Thomasson, 2003. "The Importance of Group Coverage: How Tax Policy Shaped U.S. Health Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1373-1384, September.
    3. David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1998. "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 1, pages 1-32, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, 1998. "Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off between Competition and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 433-466.
    5. Thomasson, Melissa A., 2002. "From Sickness to Health: The Twentieth-Century Development of U.S. Health Insurance," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 233-253, July.
    6. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
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    Cited by:

    1. H. E. Frech & Michael P. Smith, 2015. "Anatomy of a Slow-Motion Health Insurance Death Spiral," North American Actuarial Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 60-72, January.
    2. John E. Murray, 2011. "Asymmetric Information and Countermeasures in Early Twentieth‐Century American Short‐Term Disability Microinsurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 78(1), pages 117-138, March.
    3. Stanfors, Maria & Karlsson, Tobias & Andersson, Lars-Fredrik & Eriksson, Liselotte, 2022. "Membership in Mutual Health Insurance Societies: The Case of Swedish Manufacturing, circa 1900," Lund Papers in Economic History 238, Lund University, Department of Economic History.
    4. Jeske, Karsten & Kitao, Sagiri, 2009. "U.S. tax policy and health insurance demand: Can a regressive policy improve welfare?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 210-221, March.
    5. Gottlieb, Daniel, 2007. "Asymmetric information in late 19th century cooperative insurance societies," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 270-292, April.

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