IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eurman/v10y1992i4p453-459.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corporate governance: Why agency theory is not enough

Author

Listed:
  • Band, David

Abstract

The author discusses agency theory, or the managerial theory of the firm, and finds it suffers from limitations. However, the theory does illuminate conflicts of self-interest, such as those between shareholders and top management. David Band concludes with a further reservation about agency theory -- its avoidance of ways in which exploitation can be structurally encouraged by the asymmetric distribution of power in bureaucracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Band, David, 1992. "Corporate governance: Why agency theory is not enough," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 453-459, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eurman:v:10:y:1992:i:4:p:453-459
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/026323739290011R
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Judge, William Q. & Naoumova, Irina & Koutzevol, Nadejda, 2003. "Corporate governance and firm performance in Russia: an empirical study," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 385-396, November.
    2. Christopher, Joe, 2010. "Corporate governance—A multi-theoretical approach to recognizing the wider influencing forces impacting on organizations," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 683-695.
    3. Abraham, Santhosh & Shrives, Philip J., 2014. "Improving the relevance of risk factor disclosure in corporate annual reports," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 91-107.
    4. Vidya Sukumara Panicker & Rajesh Srinivas Upadhyayula & Sumit Mitra, 2023. "Lender representatives on board of directors and internationalization in firms: an institutionalized agency perspective," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 27(1), pages 75-98, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eurman:v:10:y:1992:i:4:p:453-459. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/115/description#description .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.